Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

5-3-2008

Extending Long Term Working Memory Theory to Dynamic
Domains: The Nature of Retrieval Structures in Situation
Awareness
Mark T. Jodlowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Jodlowski, Mark T., "Extending Long Term Working Memory Theory to Dynamic Domains: The Nature of
Retrieval Structures in Situation Awareness" (2008). Theses and Dissertations. 2192.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/2192

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

EXTENDING LONG TERM WORKING MEMORY THEORY TO
DYNAMIC DOMAINS: THE NATURE OF RETRIEVAL
STRUCTURES IN SITUATION AWARENESS

By
Mark T. Jodlowski

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Applied Cognitive Science
in the Department of Psychology
Mississippi State, Mississippi
May 2008

EXTENDING LONG TERM WORKING MEMORY THEORY TO
DYNAMIC DOMAINS: THE NATURE OF RETRIEVAL
STRUCTURES IN SITUATION AWARENESS

By
Mark T. Jodlowski
Approved:

Gary L. Bradshaw
Professor of Psychology
(Director of Dissertation)

Philip D. Bridges
Associate Professor Emeritus
Aerospace Engineering
(Committee Member)

J. Martin Giesen
Professor of Psychology
(Committee Member)

Carrick Williams
Assistant Professor of Psychology
(Committee Member)

Kevin J. Armstrong
Associate Professor of Psychology
Graduate Coordinator in the
Department of Psychology

Gary L. Myers
Interim Dean of the College of Arts
& Sciences

Name: Mark T. Jodlowski
Date of Degree: May 3, 2008
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Applied Cognitive Science
Major Professor: Dr. Gary L. Bradshaw
Title of Study: EXTENDING LONG TERM WORKING MEMORY THEORY TO
DYNAMIC DOMAINS: THE NATURE OF RETRIEVAL
STRUCTURES IN SITUATION AWARENESS
Pages in Study: 111
Candidate for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Research suggests situation awareness supports operator performance (e.g.,
Durso, Truitt, Hackworth, Crutchfield, & Manning, 1998), however no consensus
definition exists (Rousseau, Tremblay, & Breton, 2004). One framework that
incorporates most definitions is Endsley’s (1995a) hierarchical view. It includes
perception of elements in the environment, comprehension, and projection of future
status. Although the literature has slowly begun to accept a hierarchical view of situation
awareness, evidence supporting this claim is limited and indirect. Several researchers
have suggested that long-term working memory (LTWM), a theory of a memory process
that explains how individuals can rapidly encode information in long-term memory and
retrieve information from long-term memory, supports the development of situation
awareness. However, a critical review of past research reveals that it cannot be concluded

that long-term working memory was being employed, and therefore the role that LTWM
plays in situation awareness is still uncertain. To address these issues, ten instrumentrated pilots provided verbal reports while watching various flight scenarios unfold.
Periodically, the simulation froze and the screen went blank. While the screen was blank,
pilots answered questions about the current flight situation either immediately or after
completing a 30 second working-memory-intensive task that precluded working memory
involvement in performance. Responses to the questions were used to assess pilot
situation awareness. Results indicate that situation awareness is hierarchical in nature and
that the familiar mechanisms of LTWM are evident in pilot verbal protocols and
measures of situation awareness. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that
characteristics associated with pilot training methodologies in conjunction with familiar
mechanisms of LTWM predict measures of situation awareness. It was also revealed that
pilots focus on position and control information more so than specific instrument values.
Data are consistent with pilot utilization of a retrieval structure where the pilot’s mental
representation of the situation is driven by strategy. They are also consistent with a
comprehension-based model of dynamic environments (Durso, Rawson, & Girotto,
2007). Finally, these data suggest that an event-based training technique may facilitate
developing and maintaining situation awareness.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Dynamic tasks such as piloting an aircraft, driving an automobile, and directing
air traffic control provide environments where the situation constantly changes at a brisk
pace. Such tasks pose a considerable cognitive load when compared to static tasks (Reder
& Schunn, 1999). For example, piloting an aircraft involves understanding the
relationship between the lateral, longitudinal, and vertical axes while at the same time
trying to navigate using a sluggish aircraft. The three axes interact with each other while
the sluggish system imposes an additional demand on the pilot: To successfully control a
sluggish system (airplane) the pilot must have the ability to mentally predict the future
state of the system (e.g., Wickens, 1999). In addition the pilot must communicate with air
traffic control while monitoring and managing the plane.
To accomplish these tasks successfully, the operator (i.e., the pilot) must have
good situation awareness (Endsley & Smolensky, 1998). Situation awareness can be
broadly defined as operator interpretation of surrounding information for immediate and
future needs. It is a term that emerged from the domain of aviation and has since been
extended into various domains such as medical dispatch (e.g., Blandford & Wong, 2004),
power plant operations (e.g., Hogg, Folleso, Strand-Volden, & Torralba, 1995) and
driving (e.g., Ma & Kaber, 2007).
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A strong relationship has been found between operator situation awareness and
performance: good situation awareness leads to increased operator performance, whereas
poor situation awareness often leads to poor performance. For example, Durso, Truitt,
Hackworth, Crutchfield, and Manning (1998) examined operational error reports
published by the FAA. The reports are reviews of situations where air traffic control
failed to maintain adequate separation between two or more aircraft. The reports were
classified based on the presence or absence of controller situation awareness.
Specifically, the answer to the question “Was the employee aware that an operational
error/deviation was developing?” was used to categorize the reports. Controllers without
situation awareness made significantly more severe errors compared to those classified as
having situation awareness suggesting that situation awareness is a factor in controller
performance.
As previously mentioned, situation awareness can be broadly defined as operator
interpretation of surrounding information for immediate and future needs. This broad
definition is derived from various definitions being used today. Unfortunately no
consensus definition exists at the moment (Rousseau, Termlay, & Breton, 2004). For
instance, the Aerospace Glossary for Human Factors Engineers defines situation
awareness as “keeping track of the prioritized significant events and conditions in one’s
environment.” Adams, Tenney, and Pew (1995) define situation awareness as the product
and process of a “state of awareness”. The product refers to active information currently
stored in working memory. The process refers to the cognitive processing associated with
construction of an updated state of awareness. Sarter and Woods (1991) employed a third
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definition: “situation awareness is based on the integration of knowledge resulting from
recurrent situation assessments” (p. 50).
One prominent framework that encompasses most definitions of situation
awareness is Endsley’s (1995a) information processing view. Endsley’s framework is
based on hierarchically organized levels of situation awareness. Level 1 situation
awareness involves the perception and processing of salient cues in the environment. In
the domain of aviation, some examples include: identifying aircraft near you, perceiving
warning lights, and reading instruments. Level 2 situation awareness is the ability to
comprehend the current situation by integrating the perceived environment and cues with
individual background knowledge and goals, thus creating a situation model. For
example, the pilot might recognize that he/she is above the altitude assigned by air traffic
control. Level 3 situation awareness is the ability to utilize the situation model to predict
the future status of the current system; that is, the pilots are able to anticipate the result of
their actions or inactions.
In summary, the three levels of situation awareness in Endsley’s (1995a)
hierarchical framework include 1) the perception of elements in the environment, 2)
integration of the perceived elements with background knowledge and goals, and 3) use
of the integrated elements to predict the future situational state. Various researchers have
adopted Endsley’s (1995a; 2000a) view of situation awareness and have used it as a basis
for research in areas including medical dispatch (e.g., Blandford & Wong, 2004), conflict
detection (e.g., Loft, Humphreys, & Neal, 2004), system display (e.g., Billingsely,
Kuchar, & Jacobson, 2001; Schnell, Kwon, & Merchant, 2004), decision making (e.g.,
Kobus, Proctor, & Holste, 2001; Lerch & Harter, 2001; Smith, Johnston, & Paris, 2004),
3

driving (e.g., Vogel, Kircher, & Alm, 2003; Matthews, Bryant, & Webb, 2001) military
operations, (e.g., Eid, Johnsen, & Brun, 2004), and air-traffic control, (e.g., Morineau,
Hoc, & Denecker, 2003).
To illustrate how Endsley’s (1995a) framework encompasses various definitions,
consider a definition provided by Wickens (1995). Relying on an extensive review of
definitions by Dominguez (1994), Wickens defines situation awareness as “the
continuous extraction of environmental information about a system or environment, the
integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental
picture, and the use of that picture in directing further perception, anticipating and
responding to future events” (p. K2-1). Clearly Wickens’s definition bears a striking
resemblance to Endsley’s hierarchical framework. Wickens’s “extraction of
environmental information” maps to perception in Endsley’s Level 1 situation awareness.
The integration and forming a mental picture is equivalent to comprehension (Level 2
situation awareness). Finally, using the information to anticipate and respond to future
demands is equivalent to projection (Level 3 situation awareness).
Whereas Endsley’s (1995a) framework remains prominent in the literature, few if
any studies have been designed to directly examine the hierarchical nature of situation
awareness. Endsley (2000b) has designed, developed, and tested a methodology to assess
situation awareness, however these reported results do not demonstrate a direct relation
between each of the three levels of situation awareness. That is, results have only implied
that level 1 situation awareness is a precursor to level 2 situation awareness and level 2
situation awareness is a precursor to level 3 situation awareness.
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Information Processing and Situation Awareness
Based on a detailed review of the definition of situation awareness and case
studies in aviation, Adams, Tenney, and Pew (1995) argue that building and maintaining
situation awareness is a cognitively demanding task because operators must select and
interpret available information in a multidimensional and ever-changing environment.
For example, consider the task of landing an airplane as described by Adams, Tenney,
and Pew. Pilots have to: 1) monitor their descent rate, 2) perform prelanding checklists,
3) communicate with air traffic control, 4) look for traffic (i.e., other aircraft), 5) interpret
the impact of the current weather, 6) integrate approach procedure information with the
current situation, 7) ignore irrelevant radio communication between other aircraft and air
traffic control, and 8) fly the aircraft. Furthermore, the three levels of situation awareness
impose additional demands because they necessarily involve switching between levels
along several dimensions. That is, in order to build a complete and accurate picture of the
evolving situation, pilots must perceive, comprehend, and project information along three
axes: lateral (i.e., an imaginary line that extends from wingtip to wingtip), longitudinal
(i.e., an imaginary line that extends through the nose and the tail), and vertical (i.e., an
imaginary vertical line extending through the intersection of the lateral and longitudinal
axes). Thus additional processing is necessary to coordinate these functions. Given the
complexity of building and maintaining situation awareness, Adams, Tenney, and Pew
urge that “more basic research on the nature and dynamics of knowledge and processes
involved in the understanding of real-time events” be performed (p. 102).
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Information Processing Limitations
In piloting an airplane, the flight situation is constantly changing at a rapid pace
often resulting in novel situations. Further, there is a constant need to plan ahead; that is,
the pilot needs to extract the flight situation and determine appropriate courses of actions
given the multitude of events that can occur. In most information processing models
working memory acts as the immediate temporary central storage and processor (Wickens
& Carswell, 1997). Thus, it would seem logical that working memory is the key cognitive
mechanism that supports the development of situation awareness. However, as will be
discussed below, working memory is a limited processing and storage construct (e.g.,
Klatzky, 1980) and the demands of situation awareness appear to exceed the processing
and storage capacity of working memory. Consequently, an alternative explanation is
necessary.
Working Memory Limitations and Situation Awareness
Various researchers (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1992)
have argued that there are finite resources available for generation and storage of
intermediate products. For example, Just and Carpenter (1992) proposed that text
comprehension is constrained by individual WM capacity. Once an individual’s WM
capacity is reached, the lack of available processing and storage hinders individual ability
to utilize and retain new information and intermediate products resulting from newly
obtained information. This exhaustion of working memory capacity results in decreased
comprehension.
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Various studies have also linked working memory to performance in several
different tasks including syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Copeland & Radvansky, 2004),
algebra word problem solving (e.g., Lee, Ng, Ng, & Lim, 2004), Tower of Hanoi (Zook,
Davalos, DeLosh, & Davis, 2004), spatial visualization (e.g., Shah and Miyake, 1996)
and the ability to follow complex directions (Engle, Carullo, & Collins, 1991).
Consistent with a finite working memory capacity, Cowan (2001) argued that the
amount of processing and storage available in working memory is approximately 4
chunks of information. The limit of 4 chunks of information is based on a review an
extensive review of research findings (e.g., Murray, 1968; Hitch, Burgess, Towse, &
Culpin, 1996). In these studies the use of long-term memory and additional processing
were minimized by using a small set of stimuli, requiring recall in exact order, and
adding an articulatory suppression task. Taken together, these studies suggest that there is
a severe limit to the amount of processing and storage available to working memory.
Likewise, in the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) model, processing and storage of verbal and
spatial information are capacity-constrained resources.
Recall that piloting an aircraft involves navigating using a sluggish system about
lateral, longitudinal, and vertical axes, communicating with air traffic control, and
managing the aircraft. Also recall that building and maintaining situation awareness to
support piloting requires perception of environmental cues, comprehension, and
projection in a constantly changing environment. Based on the quantity and complexity
of these tasks, it seems likely that building and maintaining situation awareness exceeds
available working memory processing and storage resources. If working memory
capacity is constrained as the research mentioned above suggests, it is difficult to
7

understand how a large quantity of constantly changing values can be processed to build
and maintain situation awareness.
Given the severe capacity limits of working memory, situation awareness
information would have to be maintained in a larger-capacity store to accommodate the
considerable information that must be integrated. One obvious candidate would be longterm memory, which clearly has the capacity to store the necessary information.
However, it has been argued that storage in long-term memory requires 5 to 10 seconds
per chunk of information (Newell & Simon, 1972). Storing information at this measured
pace is inconsistent with the dynamic nature of flight. After 5 or 10 seconds, the current
situation may have changed in such a manner that the previous situation is irrelevant. For
example, in as little as 5 to 10 seconds a pilot can go from being on course for landing to
so far off course they must perform a missed approach. Here the constraint is not
capacity but storage rate: It would be impossible to store and update, moment by
moment, a complex representation of all the information needed for flight in long-term
memory. How is it then that individuals successfully build and maintain situation
awareness for the purpose of supporting airplane piloting?
Durso and Gronlund (1999) suggest a third possibility: that long-term working
memory (LTWM) is used to develop situation awareness. LTWM can be defined as
specialized encoding and retrieval processes that are acquired as a result of becoming an
expert in a particular domain and can only be used within the domain of expertise
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson, Patel, & Kintsch, 2000).
According to LTWM theory, individuals can extend working memory capacity well
beyond traditional limits (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980;
8

Miller, 1956) when three specific requirements are met. First, the individual must be able
to quickly encode domain-specific information into long-term memory. The encoding
ability requires that the individual be able to quickly recognize patterns and specific
situations. Pattern recognition develops as an individual gains experience with a
significant body of knowledge for the given domain. Second, the individual must be able
to anticipate the use of information so that it can be associated with cues that will permit
retrieval on demand even after a delay. Finally, the individual must be able to generate
contextual cues used to facilitate recall.
According to LTWM theory, the same type of memory mechanisms mediates
performance in various domains such as chess, mental multiplication, and medical
expertise (Ericsson, Patel, & Kintsch, 2000). Assuming the same memory mechanisms
can be extended to all domains, Durso and Gronlund’s claim that LTWM supports the
development of situation awareness is logical. However, to accept a LTWM explanation
of how operators build and maintain situation awareness, it is necessary to examine
whether LTWM can be employed in all the activities needed for situation awareness. A
review of LTWM theory is provided below.
LTWM Theory
LTWM is a theory of a memory process that explains how individuals can rapidly
encode information in long-term memory and retrieve information from long-term
memory. The theory emerged from Chase and Ericsson’s (1982) skilled memory theory.
In LTWM theory, domain-specific knowledge and meaningful experiences increase
individual ability to efficiently encode information into long-term memory and to create
9

easily accessible retrieval structures. Consistent with early theoretical accounts of skilled
memory (e.g., Chase & Ericsson, 1982), Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) defined a retrieval
structure as “a set of retrieval cues [that] are organized in a stable structure” (p. 216). In
addition to retrieval structures, Ericsson and Kintsch suggested that information can also
be encoded as an elaborated structure. The elaborated structure may be based on patterns
or schemas and can be linked to other newly encoded information. Finally, it is possible
that the elaborated structure and retrieval structure merge into one complex structure used
to facilitate performance.
According to LTWM theory, information can be accessed via an index that
points to the retrieval, elaborated, and/or merged structures described above. The
structures consist of organized, situation specific information stored in long-term
memory. Thus, the index provides fast access to an individual’s long-term memory rather
than having to search long-term memory. The indices point to information stored in
various locations, consequently linking all of the information together and providing
access to relevant information. To create indices and use retrieval structures an individual
must be capable of using domain knowledge to rapidly organize information and
anticipate its future use. Because the information is stored in long-term memory, after a
disruption, activating the necessary indices required to retrieve the situation-specific
information allows for the completion of the given task. The generated indices change
dynamically as a function of the current task and the individual’s expertise for that
particular task.
LTWM is normally acquired as an integral part of skills that an individual
masters. Therefore, the structure of LTWM will vary with the retrieval demands and
10

semantic representation of the acquired skill. The acquired memory skills, that is, LTWM
skills, can be used to evaluate complex plans, monitor performance, and reflect on how to
improve performance. Thus, Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) LTWM theory posits that
various domains use the same types of processes to mediate performance. However, these
processes facilitate performance only for the given domain of expertise.
Previous LTWM Research
Research has implicated LTWM in some astounding feats of memory: Chase and
Ericsson (1982) worked with participants SF and DD who were able to demonstrate a
“memory span” of around 80 and 68 digits, respectively. Based on verbal protocols, the
authors were able to identify the use of a hierarchical retrieval structure that utilized
preexisting knowledge. Specifically, DD transformed individual digits to groups of digits
associated with categories of running times. Each category was associated with several
sub-categories. An example coding of a digit string might begin with a cluster of digits
that was close to a new world record for a 100-m dash, followed by a cluster of digits that
represented an old world record mile time, followed by a cluster of digits that represented
the one-mile indoor world record and so on. Similarly, Staszewski (1988) examined the
underlying structures of two undergraduates who were trained to be experts in mental
multiplication. He found that mental multiplication of two and three digit numbers
involved generating specific encoding rules that are used to arrange partial products
hierarchically.
Additional studies that have been interpreted in terms of LTWM retrieval
structures include studies involving a waiters ability memorize dinner orders (Ericsson &
11

Polson, 1988), a comparison of physician and medical student knowledge organization
(Coughlin & Patel, 1987), and a chess masters ability to retrieve chess piece types (e.g., a
knight) from specified locations after briefly viewing the chess board (Ericsson &
Staszewski, 1989). As a more recent example, Williamon and Valentine (2002) collected
protocols from four small groups (4 to 5 people) of musicians. They found that
musicians use retrieval structures to memorize musical composition and that the retrieval
structures increase in complexity with skill level.
Symbolic Nature of LTWM
The domains that have been best represented by LTWM skill are symbolic and
unfold at a relatively slow pace. For example, the game of chess involves identifying
game configurations (e.g., Queen’s Knight Gambit, English Opening) that allow the
player to plan and reason about alternative courses of action. According to LTWM
theory, chess masters use a chessboard-like retrieval structure to encode and retrieve
patterns of information (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Playing chess, therefore, can be
characterized as a manipulation of symbols where symbols are defined as discrete
patterns of information that can be operated upon (Simon, 1996). The symbols are
manipulated according to rules in an effort to obtain some goal (e.g., obtain control over
the center of the board). Similarly, in music, Williamon and Valentine (2002) found that
expert musicians use structural bars to hierarchically arrange music. The hierarchical
structures were then used to encode and retrieve notes. In other words, structural units are
encoded and retrieved prior to specific notes.
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Unlike playing chess and memorizing music, aviating involves graded
comparisons of instrument values and temporal constraints. Instruments have several
values associated with them. For example, in a typical training aircraft (e.g., Cessna 172),
a pilot might expect a normal operating range of 1100 to 2700 rpm on the tachometer.
The difference between a power setting of 2200 and 2250 rpm may be the difference
between maintaining altitude and airspeed and a slight climb.
When considering how pilots internally represent information presented on
gauges such as tachometers and airspeed indicators it is likely that the information is
represented noncategorically (i.e., nonsymbolically). A noncategorical representation is
likely because precise values are not necessary to successfully accomplish real-world
tasks (Norman, 1998). When reading an instrument, an exact value is likely difficult or
impossible to perceive. Pilots are better served remembering an approximate range rather
than a precise value. Ranges facilitate performance because they help pilots adapt to the
current situation. The performance of an airplane can vary given the same power setting
because several variables (e.g., temperature, barometric pressure, altitude, and airplane
surface contamination) impact performance and it behooves the pilot to make
adjustments based on the current performance of the aircraft. In other words, the same
flight configuration (e.g., power setting and pitch) does not always provide the same
performance. Thus, reference points and deviations from reference points rather than
specific values better serve the pilot.
Along the same lines, the dynamic nature of flight, specifically varying levels of
rates of change, are not well suited for symbolic representations. Like instrument values,
rates of change are also graded. For example, the glide slope needle can be moving very
13

fast, very slow, or anywhere in between. Understanding rates of change has a direct
impact on operator ability to project the future status of the system (Endsley, 1995a).
Graded comparisons such as those mentioned above do not lend themselves well to
symbolic representations because symbols are discrete and categorical. A piece on a
chessboard might be a rook or a knight, but it cannot be somewhere between the two.
Accordingly, symbols either do or do not match. Similarly, in music, the continuous
frequency spectrum has been sampled and simplified into a “note and octave” structure
that eliminates nearly every possible sound as a musical note: only 88 of the tens of
thousands of frequencies that we can discriminate are employed on a piano keyboard.
Even these 88 notes are further divided into octaves, so the ‘same’ note A appears in each
octave. Each octave on the western scale contains 12 notes: 7 basic notes (A-G) and 5
variants (A#, C#, D#, F# G#). Thus we find musical scales are symbolic in their
underlying structure, in spite of the continuous nature of sound.
Recall that one of the specific requirements that must be met to have LTWM is
that the individual must be able to quickly recognize patterns and specific situations. For
example, in chess, a “knight fork” is a precise relationship between three pieces. The
knight can reach only eight different squares at most, and if two of those squares are
occupied by an opponent’s pieces, the knight can capture one of them regardless of the
opponent’s move. In contrast the graded values of instruments, which represent different
elements of the airplane’s status, could produce an almost limitless set of combinations.
Further as mentioned earlier, dials and gauges are likely represented noncategorically to
better serve the pilot (Norman, 1998). Consequently, the possibility of the pilot
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representing the situation symbolically and being able to form stable and reusable chunks
is unlikely.
One might argue that in domains such as chess and music there are limitless
patterns of information as well. The number of different possible chess board
configurations is so vast that contemporary high-speed parallel chess machines cannot
hope to search them all. But evidence suggests people simplify boards by recognizing
small clusters of pieces at a time (Chase & Simon, 1988). Even this skill is estimated to
require 10 years of intense practice to master (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). Further, chess
players also have a minute or two to study the board and make their move.
In contrast, information presented in a cockpit is in a constant state of change:
Pilots do not have the luxury of studying the situation for a minute or two before deciding
upon their next move. In addition, the independent axes of the airplane (up, down, left,
right) do not seem to naturally organize into neat hierarchical arrangements. Finally,
pilots have sufficient situation awareness to solo (i.e., fly the plane without an instructor)
after approximately 10 hours of in flight training and obtain their license after
approximately 40 hours. If we accept the argument that situation awareness is necessary
for piloting (Endsley & Smolensky, 1998), this rapid skill acquisition does not
correspond to traditional tasks that have been explained via LTWM theory. Thus, it
remains unclear if LTWM skill can be meaningfully extended to dynamic nonsymbolic
domains.
These differences suggest that LTWM, as it is traditionally understood, may not
be the cognitive mechanism that underlies a pilot’s situation awareness skill.
Nevertheless, LTWM mechanisms do otherwise match the information processing
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demands of situation awareness: It is reasonable to hypothesize that encoding skills may
be a major contributor to the building and maintaining of situation awareness.
LTWM and Situation Awareness
As mentioned earlier, Durso and Gronlund (1999) proposed that LTWM skill is
the key cognitive construct that supports the development and maintenance of situation
awareness. Their proposal was based on deficiencies of working memory to hold the rich
set of information needed to construct and maintain situation awareness. Another line of
research that suggests working memory is not heavily involved in situation awareness
was provided by Barnett (1989). In his experiment, pilots completed a battery of domainindependent (e.g., visual number span, visual scanning, and first order pursuit tasks) and
domain-dependent (e.g., Air Traffic Control recall and recognition and dynamic flight
diagnosis tasks) information processing measures. The pilots then flew a simulated crosscountry flight. Throughout the flight subject pilots were asked to make several decisions.
If domain-general information processing measures such as those mentioned above are
key cognitive components to the development and maintenance of situation awareness
then we would expect that these same measures would be related to pilot decision making
as situation awareness is a precursor to decision making (Endsley, 2000a). However,
Barnett found that the various measures of memory span and processing such as visual
scanning and first order pursuit tracking had little relationship with aeronautical decision
making.
Similar to Barnett’s aeronautical decision-making study, Mogford and Tansley
(1991) had air traffic controller trainees complete a battery of memory tests and perform
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simulated job tasks. They found that the memory tests were not predictive of
performance.
A final example of research that suggests situation awareness information does
not solely reside in working memory is Endsley’s (1995b) validation of the situation
awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT). In her study she administered SAGAT
queries in random order while pilots flew in a high fidelity flight simulator. The queries
were based on each of Endsley’s hierarchical levels. In addition they were presented to
the pilots with delays ranging from 20 seconds to 6 minutes; every time the simulation
was paused all queries were presented but in a random order. For example, the pilot may
have been asked the current altitude first, last, or anywhere in between. Randomizing the
query order allowed Endsley (1995b) to compare the accuracy of pilot responses to the
SAGAT queries across time intervals. She found that the accuracy of the responses were
equivalent regardless of the time delay; that is, the time delay did not impact individual
situation awareness.
Because of the temporary and limited nature of working memory, situation
awareness likely utilizes alternative memory processes (Durso & Gronlund, 1999).
Without active processing to maintain the information, situation awareness would decay.
As mentioned above, pilots in Endsley’s (1995b) study responded to questions after
delays ranging from 20 seconds to 6 minutes and performance was not impacted. At the
surface, these data are consistent with Durso and Gronlunds proposal that situation
awareness is not maintained in a volatile and short-lived working memory. However, as
Endsley notes in her study, situation awareness information is being processed at all
times even while the simulation is paused. Therefore, it is possible that the active
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processing of the flight information results in the retention of situation awareness in
working memory. As a result, the argument that situation awareness information is not
retained in working memory must be interpreted with caution.
In order to prevent rehearsal of active information, filler tasks that involve active
processing can be used during delays (e.g., Peterson and Peterson, 1959). For example,
Sohn and Doane (2003; 2004) had pilots count backward by three for 30 seconds from a
random number as quickly and accurately as possible before being asked to recall a
specific cockpit situation. The additional processing and storage of information needed
for the counting backwards task effectively clears out an individual’s working memory
because intermediate counting products must be stored and maintained. In Endsley’s
(1995b) study, pilots could have maintained this information in working memory by
simply rehearsing and processing critical situation awareness information. To rule out
this possibility, pilots would have to complete a filler task similar to the Sohn and Doane
task to eliminate the contents of working memory.
Sohn and Doane (2003; 2004) explored the role of LTWM in situation awareness
by developing a measure of LTWM that included the filler task described above (i.e.,
counting backward by three from a given number). The LTWM skill measure was based
on recall studies analogous to those conducted in the chess domain (e.g., de Groot, 1965,
Charness, 1976). In the chess studies, meaningful and non-meaningful chess
configurations were presented to novice and expert chess players. The chess players were
asked to recall the chess configuration. When the presented chess configurations were
meaningful, experts could recall most if not all configurations whereas novices could
only recall approximately seven pieces. When the presented chess configurations were
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nonmeaningful, expert and novice performance did not differ; expert recall performance
dropped to novice levels. One interpretation of these results is that experts could use
domain specific encoding skills, acquired skills, and background knowledge to efficiently
process information in long-term memory when the configurations were meaningful.
However, when the configurations were meaningless, their background knowledge did
not help and domain-specific encoding processes could not be used to facilitate
performance.
To measure LTWM skill, Sohn and Doane (2003; 2004) asked novice and expert
pilots to simultaneously view two simplified instrument panels consisting of seven
instruments with limited detail. In this study, pilot expertise was based on individual pilot
responses to a flight experience questionnaire measuring flight time, total number of
ratings earned (e.g., instrument, commercial, instructor) and recent flight time. Data from
the questionnaire were submitted to a factor analysis (varimax rotation). The resulting
factor scores were submitted to a discriminant analysis for grouping purposes. The
expert group consisted primarily of flight instructors whereas novices were primarily
student pilots that had not received a private pilot certificate.
The seven instruments on each of the simultaneously presented instrument panels
were either meaningfully related to one another or were not. For the meaningful trials,
one of the instrument panels was the starting situation and the second instrument panel
represented the current situation after one or two controls were hypothetically applied to
the starting situation. For example, the starting situation might indicate that the plane is in
a climbing turn whereas the second situation might indicate that the turn is complete but
the plane in still climbing.
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In the meaningless trials, both instrument panels had conflicting instruments. For
example, on the top instrument panel, the turn coordinator might indicate that the plane is
in a standard rate turn while the attitude indicator showed the plane flying straight and
level. After viewing the instrument panels, pilots were asked to count backward by 3
from a random number for 30 seconds. As mentioned earlier, counting backward by 3 is a
filler task often used to prevent deliberate rehearsal of information in working memory
(e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1959). After the filler task, the pilots were asked to recall one
of the instrument panels. LTWM skill was determined by calculating the difference in
recall between the meaningfully related and nonmeaningful instrument panels. This
measure of LTWM skill is based on LTWM theory. According to the theory, generation
and use of retrieval structures is possible in the meaningful situations because pilots can
use their extensive knowledge and background to generate the necessary retrieval cues.
That is, typical flight situations can provide meaningful patterns of information and
encoding processes can be used to store information in long-term memory whereas in the
nonmeaningful situations, patterns would not be identified and LTWM encoding
processes could not be used.
The aforementioned measure of LTWM was used to successfully predict a
measure of situation awareness. To measure situation awareness, Sohn & Doane (2003;
2004) had pilots view a basic instrument panel consisting of seven instruments and a
specific goal for 20 seconds. An intermediate flight situation represented by seven
instruments and the same goal followed. The flight situations in sequence were either
consistent or inconsistent with reaching the goal in the next 5 seconds. The pilot’s task
was to determine if the sequential flight situations were consistent with reaching the goal.
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The second flight situation remained on the screen until the pilot made a decision. Sohn
and Doane claimed that in order to succeed at this task, pilots had to incorporate all three
levels of Endsley’s (1995a) framework. More specifically they had to perceive the
situation (Level 1 situation awareness), comprehend the situation (Level 2 situation
awareness) and project the flight situation forward (Level 3 situation awareness). Results
of a hierarchical regression analysis indicated that their measure of LTWM skill was
predictive of situation awareness: Entering LTWM skill into the regression resulted in a
significant increment in explained variance (R2 = .15). Sohn and Doane concluded that a
meaning based retrieval structure supports the development of situation awareness.
Although the Sohn and Doane (2003; 2004) studies provide an important first step
at understanding the linkage between LTWM and situation awareness, a critical
evaluation leads to some unanswered questions. First, the Sohn and Doane measure of
LTWM was based on the difference between recall of the meaningful and nonmeaningful
instrument panels after viewing the simultaneously presented instrument panels for 40
seconds. Results indicated that novice and expert recall performance did not differ for the
nonmeaningful instrument panels. However different results have been obtained in other
domains. In Gobet and Simon’s (1996) review of chess literature exploring recall of
random positions, they found that even at short durations stronger chess players
outperform weaker players. Lories (1987) explored the impact of a longer (i.e., 60second) exposure and also found that expert recall of random pieces exceeded novice
performance. Similarly, Vicente (1992) found that expert recall exceeded novices after a
25-30 second viewing of a dynamic process control system in both semantic and random
configurations. These types of results hold true for other domains such as musical
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notation (Halpern & Bower, 1982), computer programs (Adelson, 1981) and volleyball
diagrams (Allard & Burnett, 1985). Given these results, it is puzzling that experts did not
exceed novices in the recall of nonmeaningful instrument panels.
One alternative explanation is that expert pilots are better able to form long-term
memory chunks compared to novice pilots. As mentioned previously, storage in longterm memory requires 5 to 10 seconds per chunk of information (Newell & Simon,
1972). Given that pilots had 40 seconds to view the simultaneously presented meaningful
and non-meaningful screenshots, it is possible that Sohn and Doane were examining
expert long-term memory chunking ability rather than LTWM. Therefore, the measure
used by Sohn and Doane (Sohn & Doane, 2003; 2004) to measure LTWM may not be
valid. Further, their research did not explore how pilots encoded information from the
instrument panel, nor how the knowledge was organized, stored, and retrieved. As a
result, we cannot be certain that the familiar mechanisms of LTWM are at work, or if
there are some alternative memory structures and processes that underlie this result.
A second unanswered question is whether or not the Sohn and Doane (2003;
2004) situation awareness task measures all three levels of situation awareness. It could
be argued that they were in fact measuring only Level 3 situation awareness. Because
there were no direct measures of Level 1 and Level 2 situation awareness, it can only be
assumed that the presumed hierarchical nature of situation awareness is employed.
Third, there is a possibility that pilots derived a strategy to determine whether or
not the goal would be reached in the next five seconds while completing the situation
awareness task. It is possible that pilot’s examined the initial flight situation and
determined only what needed to change. They could then use the goal and observe
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deviations to support their judgment. For example if the goal was to obtain an airspeed of
90 knots, an altitude of 4000 feet, and a heading of 180, and the starting flight situation
indicated that only the altitude needed to change, the pilot did not necessarily have to
remember anything about airspeed or heading. When the pilot viewed the second
snapshot, all they would have to remember is that the altitude needed to change. If any of
the other instruments were off the pilot would immediately know the trial was
inconsistent. Given this strategy, there is a possibility that the situation awareness of
pilots was not being measured.
Finally, the task Sohn and Doane (2003; 2004) used to measure both LTWM skill
and situation awareness involved a pair of static instrument panels rather than dynamic
flight. Given that piloting an airplane necessarily involves a constant state of change,
skeptics might argue that static representations of a dynamic task do not capture the
essence of piloting an airplane. Specifically, they could argue that piloting an airplane
involves a constant building and maintenance of situation awareness whereas static trials
represent a brief snapshot in time. Similarly, Endsley (1995a) argues that situation
awareness “refers to only that portion [of knowledge] pertaining to the state of a dynamic
environment” (p. 36). It is temporal and is created via the continual processing of
information over time related to the past and future. Given this description of situation
awareness, it is reasonable to question the situation awareness task employed in the Sohn
and Doane study. To complete the situation awareness task participants had 20 seconds to
view the initial goal and starting flight situation. They also had unlimited time to make
their decision whether or not the goal would be reached. This timeframe violates the core
of situation awareness – assessment of a dynamic environment.
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A similar argument can be made in reference to the static snapshots presented to
the pilots. The static snapshots represented a brief moment in time and consisted of
unrelated trials. That is, none of the trials had any meaningful relation to the others.
Therefore it could also be argued that the situation awareness task violates a second
aspect of situation awareness; relating previous and past situations. Given the limitations
of the Sohn and Doane study, we cannot conclude that long-term working memory was
being employed in their tasks, and therefore the role that LTWM plays in situation
awareness is still uncertain.
Summary
Thus far we have discussed how the field is beginning to converge on a threelevel hierarchical view of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995a). We’ve also discussed the
high cognitive load imposed on pilots in order to build and maintain situation awareness,
how working memory can not account for this load, and an alternative theory; LTWM
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), as a supporting cognitive construct. Although LTWM has
been suggested as the memory system that supports situation awareness, only modest
evidence supports that view.
Next we will discuss various methodologies to measure situation awareness. We
will also discuss commonalities in pilot training techniques and their relation to encoding
of flight information. Both topics are necessary to understand how we can accomplish our
goal of understanding the relationship between LTWM and situation awareness.
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Measuring Situation Awareness
Because this research involves exploring how pilots encode information as it
relates to situation awareness, it is necessary to briefly discuss methodologies for
measuring situation awareness. According to Durso and Gronlund (1999), there are three
major methodologies for measuring situation awareness: subjective measures, implicit
performance, and query methods. Each is discussed in turn.
Subjective measures involve directly asking the operator about his or her situation
awareness. The most common subjective measure is Taylor’s (1990) situation awareness
rating technique (SART). This involves asking operators to rate on a bipolar scale
operator resource demand, operator resource supply, and situational understanding. The
responses are then combined to generate an overall score. Although easily obtained,
subjective measures are often criticized for their lack of validity (e.g., Nisbett, & Wilson,
1977).
Implicit performance measures of situation awareness involve the use of
performance indices at particular points during a simulation to measure situation
awareness (e.g., Pritchett & Hansman, 2000). For example, response to a critical cue or
pertinent information while performing a task would suggest the operator had good
situation awareness. However, as previously mentioned, good situation awareness does
not guarantee an appropriate response, and poor situation awareness does not guarantee
poor performance, that is, there is a chance that even with inaccurate or incomplete
situation awareness, the correct decision may be made. Further, if an individual
completely understands the situation, he/she may not know the correct response for that
situation.
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According to Vidulich (2003), the most widely accepted means of measuring
situation awareness is the query method (e.g., Endsley, 1995b). The query method
involves temporarily suspending and blanking out a simulation, and asking participants to
quickly answer task relevant questions (e.g., “What is the current altitude?”). This
procedure is repeated several times. Each time the simulation is stopped, participants are
asked to respond to different questions.
Some researchers have argued that stopping a simulation is intrusive (Sarter &
Woods, 1991) and too reliant on working memory. However, Endsley (1995b) provided
some evidence to the contrary in her validation of the situation awareness global
assessment technique (SAGAT). Recall that in Endsley’s study, SAGAT queries across
all levels of situation awareness were administered in random order throughout various
flight simulations at intervals ranging from 20 seconds to 6 minutes. Endsley found that
pilots could maintain and report their situation awareness minutes after stopping an
aircraft simulation. That is, all information was available regardless of when queried.
These results suggest that the query technique is nonintrusive and not reliant on working
memory.
Unfortunately, the evidence once again is less than compelling; it could be argued
that because a filler task was not used (e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1959) and that subjects
were well aware of the questions they would be asked by the end of the delay period,
subjects may have rehearsed the information during the unfilled pauses. Rehearsal is
unlikely because the quantity of information that would have to be rehearsed would seem
to exceed the capacity of pilots given a limited working memory capacity (e.g., Baddeley
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and Hitch, 1974). Consequently, it is unclear whether or not rehearsal helped facilitate
performance.
To provide more evidence about the intrusiveness of interruptions, Endsley
(2000b) examined whether or not the threat of pausing the simulation would affect
performance. Six pilots were asked to complete various air-to-air fighter sweep missions.
For the first type of mission the pilots were told that the simulation would not stop. For
the other type of mission the pilots were told that SAGAT data may or may not be
collected. The collection of SAGAT data requires a pause in the simulation. Half of the
trials in the latter mission type included a stop, thus creating three types of missions (no
pause/none expected, pause/expected, no pause/expected). Performance measures
collected for all three mission types were equivalent; that is, expecting a pause did not
impact performance, nor did an actual pause disrupt performance. Given the results of the
reviewed studies, the proposed study will use a query method to assess situation
awareness. Details describing gradations of situation awareness and the method of
assessment are provided in Chapter II.

Pilot Training
The development of retrieval structures may be guided by pilot training
techniques. Specifically, pilots are trained to constantly scan their instruments. Scanning
the instruments allows the pilot to monitor and check the system performance, that is,
they can use the instruments to determine their position in space, rates of change, if there
are any problems (e.g., instrument failure) and given their goals, whether or not
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corrections have to be made. Therefore, a brief description of the typical training methods
associated with instrument flight is provided next.
Most instrument flight training books differentiate between the control and
performance method and the primary and supporting method. The control and
performance method uses the attitude indicator and tachometer in combination with the
manifold pressure gauge (if equipped) to control the aircraft; that is, these instruments are
the only instruments that are referred to when making control changes. The attitude
indicator is used to indicate pitch and bank and the tachometer is used to indicate power.
The remaining instruments, altimeter, airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, heading
indicator, and turn coordinator are used to monitor the performance of the aircraft once a
control is set. If the performance instruments indicate that the plane is not in the desired
state, the pilot returns to the attitude indicator and tachometer/manifold pressure gauge to
make adjustments.
The primary and supporting method is the second technique taught and is
recommended by the FAA. This method involves grouping instruments based on both
their control and performance. The instruments are categorized as pitch, bank, and power
instruments. (See Table 1.1.) Because each maneuver has particular pitch, bank, and
power requirements, the instruments that provide the most essential information are
deemed primary for that maneuver. The remaining instruments are the supporting or
secondary instruments. A brief list of maneuvers with the corresponding primary and
supporting pitch, bank, and power instruments is provided in Table 1.2.

28

Both of the methods described above rely on the pilot being capable of
interpreting the instruments, an essential skill to flying the aircraft (Gleim, 2004).
Instrument interpretation requires that the pilot understand how the instrument works.

Table 1.1
Categorization of Instruments
Instrument Category

Corresponding
Instruments

Pitch

Attitude Indicator
Altimeter
Airspeed Indicator
Vertical Speed Indicator

Bank

Attitude Indicator
Directional Gyroscope
Turn Coordinator

Power

Manifold Pressure
Tachometer
Airspeed Indicator

This gives the pilot the ability to assess the impact of control movements. Some
instruments are slower to respond whereas others provide a more direct indication. For
example, the airspeed indicator does not provide an instantaneous response to a pitch or
power control. It needs time to adjust and settle to the new flight configuration. In
contrast, the attitude indicator provides an almost instantaneous indication of pitch and
bank changes.
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Table 1.2
Primary and Supporting Instrument Based on Flight Goal
Goal
Straight and Level

Pitch

Bank

Power

Primary
Supporting

ALT
AI, VSI

HI
AI, TC

ASI
Tach

Primary
Supporting

ALT
AI, VSI

AI
TC

ASI
Tach

Primary
Supporting

ALT
AI, VSI

TC
AI

ASI
Tach

Primary
Supporting

ASI
AI, VSI

HI
AI, TC

Tach
ASI

Primary
Supporting

ALT
AI, VSI

TC
AI

ASI
ASI

Primary
Supporting

VSI
AI

HI
AI, TC

ASI
Tach

Establishing level standard
rate turn

Stabilized standard rate turn

Constant airspeed climb

Change in airspeed during a
level turn

Constant rate climb

AI = Attitude Indicator
ASI = Airspeed Indicator
Tach = Tachometer
VSI = Vertical Speed Indicator

ALT = Altimeter
HI = Heading Indicator
TC = Turn Coordinator
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Along the same lines, not only do the instruments have to be interpreted, but also
the values have to be transformed. Often the exact values of an instrument are not
important. Rather their relation to a particular goal is more important, with the goal
serving as a reference point. For example, if the plane is at 3100 feet and is supposed to
be at 3000 feet, the pilot may encode the current altitude in a simple qualitative
description as being “too high.” This type of encoding process might be used to generate
a new sub goal (decrease altitude) to help achieve the original goal (3000 feet). Finally,
good pilots stay ahead of the airplane (e.g., Thom, 1993); that is, they anticipate the
results of current and future control movements, plan ahead, and take advantage of less
demanding in-flight situations.
Summary
Although there is no consensus definition of situation awareness, various
researchers in different domains have adopted Endsley’s (1995a) hierarchical model of
situation awareness. Endsley’s model consists of the ability to perceive and process
salient cues in the environment, comprehend the current situation, and utilize the situation
model to project future status. Reported data supporting this model is indirect. As a result
it is unclear whether or not a hierarchical view of situation awareness is necessary.
How pilots encode information to support the building and maintenance of
situation awareness is also unclear. Given that increased levels of situation awareness
enhance the likelihood of greater performance (Endsley, 1995a), it is worthwhile to
examine the cognitive constructs that support the building and maintenance of situation
awareness. Whereas working memory would appear to be the logical primary cognitive
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construct, the demands of situation awareness far exceed working memory processing
and storage capabilities (Durso & Gronlund, 1999).
One alternative to working memory as the primary supporting construct is
LTWM. Long-term working memory is a theory of memory process that explains how
individuals can rapidly encode information in long-term memory and retrieve information
from long-term memory. To accomplish this task, individuals must be able to quickly
recognize patterns and specific situations, anticipate the use of information, and generate
contextual cues. However, the domains that have been best represented by LTWM skill
are symbolic and static in nature. In addition, to acquire such skills requires thousands of
hours of deliberate practice. These characteristics are not consistent with piloting an
aircraft. Nevertheless, LTWM mechanisms do otherwise match the information
processing demands of situation awareness.
Consistent with the hypothesis that LTWM mechanisms support the building and
maintenance of situation awareness, Sohn & Doane (2003; 2004) created a measure of
LTWM skill that predicted pilot flight situation awareness. Although their research was
an excellent starting point, a critical review of their study leads to unanswered questions.
Specifically, it could be argued that the Sohn and Doane measure of LTWM was actually
measuring expert long-term memory chunking ability rather than LTWM. Additionally, it
could be argued that the measure of situation awareness was invalid due to the static
nature of their situation awareness task compared to the dynamic nature of building and
maintaining situation awareness. It continues to remain unclear whether LTWM supports
the development and maintenance of situation awareness.
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In order to understand whether not LTWM supports pilot building and
maintenance of situation awareness it is necessary to directly measure situation
awareness in a task that can only be performed correctly with full situation awareness.
Although there are various methodologies the most prominent methodology, and the
methodology used in this study, is the query method. It is also important to note that
encoding of flight information specific to pilot training techniques likely impacts pilot
building and maintenance of situation awareness. Thus common characteristics of pilot
training are examined in this study.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT
Various researchers have proposed that LTWM is a cognitive construct that
supports the development of situation awareness (e.g., Durso & Gronlund, 1999; Sohn &
Doane, 2003; Endsley, 2000b). However, as described above the evidence supporting this
claim can be questioned. Thus, the goals of this research are to address whether or not 1)
the familiar mechanisms of LTWM are indeed evident in the processing of flight relevant
information, 2) the common characteristics of flight training methodologies integrate
with the mechanisms of LTWM skill, 3) the common characteristics themselves explain
the building and maintenance of flight situation awareness and 4) situation awareness is
hierarchical in nature.
To accomplish these goals, an experimental paradigm is needed where the flight
environment is in a constant state of change and pilots are making constant verbal
assessments of the unfolding situation. The unfolding situation would have to cover an
extended period of time and the pilots would have to be assessing the situation as if they
were about to take control of the simulation. This type of experiment would give pilots
ample opportunity to utilize past and present information to build situation awareness. It
also would provide us with an opportunity to evaluate how pilots encode flight
information and whether or not the familiar mechanisms of LTWM are at work.
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The experiment also needs to include periodic pauses during the extended
dynamic situations to allow SAGAT-like queries to be asked. To probe the pilot’s
understanding of the unfolding scenario, queries specific to each of the three different
levels of situation awareness need to be given to the pilots. Additionally, some of the
trials need to include filled pauses that flush the situation awareness information from
working memory prior to answering the queries to ensure this information is stored in a
long-term store.
The situation awareness questions need to be framed so it is possible to determine
whether or not Endsley’s (1995a) model of situation awareness is hierarchical.
Specifically a decreasing trend in accuracy when comparing the three hierarchical levels
is expected. The filled pauses exclude the possibility that situation awareness
information is being held in working memory. If data is being processed directly to longterm memory via retrieval structures as LTWM theory posits, then no differences are
expected. Additionally longer response times to the first question after a distracter task
are expected: Pilots need time to activate the retrieval structure to obtain the relevant
information.
In this experiment, pilots were asked to think-aloud (Ericsson & Simon, 1993)
while viewing various flight situations (See Figure 2.1.) The think-aloud method is based
on a human information processing model (Newell & Simon, 1972) and is designed to
provide an accurate account of individual thought processes (Ericsson & Simon). In
addition to thinking aloud, during the simulations pilots answered questions related to
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Figure 2.1 Snapshot of the cockpit pilot’s view in the experiment.
each of Endsley’s three levels of situation awareness: perception, comprehension, and
projection. These questions were given either immediately after a pause in a simulation
or after a delay that involved a distracter task inserted to eliminate the contents of
working memory. This experimental framework addresses the research goals stated
above.
A primary objective of this study is to better understand how pilots encode
information necessary to build and maintain situation awareness. Therefore two different
types of trials were included: basic flight maneuvers and complex flight procedures.
Basic flight maneuvers, such as a standard rate turn to the right, are common in early
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instrument flight training. Complex flight procedures, such as a full instrument approach
for landing the airplane, are more advanced procedures that require more skill to
accomplish correctly. Even to perform basic maneuvers like turning to a new heading,
pilots must control the pitch, bank, and power of the aircraft. That control can only be
properly exercised when pilots are able to interpret and integrate available flight
information. For example, a basic flight maneuver is a standard rate turn to a specific
compass heading while maintaining airspeed and altitude. A standard rate of turn is
3°/second. However, the amount of bank required to achieve a standard rate of turn varies
as a function of airspeed. Further, to turn to a specific heading, it is necessary for the pilot
to start his/her rollout to the heading prior to reaching the desired heading. The time to
start the rollout varies as a function of bank angle. As this example illustrates, it is
necessary to interpret and integrate various types of flight information to successfully
maneuver the plane.
The complex procedures employed in this study consisted of landing the airplane
solely by reference to the instruments. To accomplish this goal pilots have to follow
specific published instructions. (See Appendix B). These instructions are called approach
plates. In addition, the pilots must comply with instructions from air-traffic control.
Pilots were instructed to view the simulation as if they were sitting in an airplane
preparing to take over control of the airplane. Providing a viewable simulation rather than
giving pilots control of the aircraft provides an opportunity to tap into their situation
awareness while still exhibiting precise experimental control over the unfolding situation.
Tapping into pilot’s situation awareness was accomplished by asking pilots to think aloud
while viewing simulations of both the basic flight maneuvers and complex procedures.
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That is, during the simulation, pilots were asked to give a running commentary of their
thoughts as if they were actually flying the airplane. While pilots were viewing
simulations, the simulations were periodically paused. During the pause pilots were asked
to answer questions relevant to the current flight situation. The questions were presented
either immediately following a pause in the simulation or after a delay that involved the
use of working memory resources.
Questions fell into five different categories: airspeed, altitude, heading, control,
and position. Airspeed, altitude, and heading questions correspond directly to specific
instrument values. Control questions reflect a pilot’s use of the attitude indicator and
tachometer to set pitch and power for a given task. Finally, position questions are related
to the aircraft’s spatial location. The categories of questions were also derived with
Endsley’s (1995a) three levels of situation awareness in mind. Specifically each category
of questions is represented in all three levels of situation awareness questions. This
allows us to identify graded levels of situation awareness. An example question
representing each of the three levels and their associated category is presented in Table
2.1. A complete list of questions is provided in Appendix A.
Trial Description
Each trial had two phases. During the first phase pilots read a text description of a
flight situation that lead up to the start of the upcoming simulation. For the basic flight
maneuvers pilots were presented with the starting and desired airspeed, heading, and
altitude. They were also presented with the instruction that the flight instructor gave to
the pilot presumably flying the airplane. For example, “Perform a constant airspeed climb
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Table 2.1
Example Situation Awareness Questions
Situation
Awareness
Level 1
Level 2

Category

Level 3

Heading

Airspeed
Position

Example Question
“What is your current airspeed?”
“What is the aircraft’s position relative to the
desired course?”
“Approximately how long until you begin
your rollout?”

to 4000 feet while maintaining heading.” The complex procedures were slightly different.
Pilots were presented with the approach plate, starting situation, and an updated weather
briefing.
Once pilots finished reading the text description they used the mouse to press a
button labeled “Next” to advance to the next screen. This screen informed the pilot that
the simulation would begin once the click the button labeled “Next.” Pilots clicked the
button and the simulation began.
Throughout the simulation, pilots continued to think aloud about the unfolding
flight situation as if they were actually flying the airplane. In addition, the simulation was
pre-programmed to temporarily pause and the instrument panel would disappear. During
these pauses the pilots were asked to answer anywhere from five to ten questions relevant
to the current simulation (e.g., “What is your current airspeed?”). The questions covered
each of the three levels of situation awareness and always included a minimum of one set
of related questions. The questions varied in sequence between each pause and were
either multiple-choice or free response. (See Appendix A.) Each pilot received the same
questions in the same order. In approximately half of the trials, pilots were asked to
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complete a working memory intensive task (e.g., count backward by 3 from a specified
number) prior to answering the questions. This was done to prevent maintenance of
flight-specific information in working memory through active rehearsal during the delay
period. Each of the questions presented on the screen during the pauses in the simulation
pertained to one of Endsley’s (1995a) three levels of situation awareness.
Trial Details
Recall that in the Sohn and Doane (2003) study, the pilots were asked to recall
one of two static cockpit situations. Also recall that performance increased when the two
cockpits were meaningfully related; that is, recall performance increased when one
cockpit represented a starting situation and the other cockpit represented the future state
after the application of one or two control movements. The increase in recall
performance for meaningful situations compared to nonmeaningful situations was taken
as evidence supporting a meaning-based retrieval structure. In the Sohn and Doane
(2003) study, the meaningful-related trials consisted of 6 different flight situations. More
specifically, the applied controls that resulted in the future cockpit situation involved
either 1) throttle, 2) elevator, 3) aileron, 4) throttle and elevator, 5) throttle and aileron, or
6) elevator and aileron control movements. In this study, the basic maneuvers were
similar but in a dynamic environment. Three trials involving a single change in
configuration (e.g., Airspeed), and five trials involving two changes (e.g., heading and
altitude) were completed. Table 2.2 summarizes each of the different basic flight
maneuvers used in this study.
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Table 2.2
Summary of Basic Flight Maneuver Trials
Trial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Airspeed
Decrease
Increase
Maintain
Maintain
Decrease
Decrease
Maintain
Decrease

Altitude
Increase
Maintain
Maintain
Decrease
Maintain
Decrease
Decrease
Maintain

Heading
Maintain
Maintain
Left
Maintain
Right
Maintain
Right
Left

In addition to the basic flight maneuvers, three complex procedures were included
in this study. Specifically, pilots were asked to view two instrument landing system (ILS)
approaches and one very high frequency omni range (VOR) approach. The approach
plates for each are presented in Appendix B. Because approaches involve communication
with Air Traffic Control (ATC), it was necessary to temporarily pause the approaches
when ATC made a request and when the simulated pilot responded. Each communication
pause was programmed into the simulation. Participant pilots read the verbal
communication between the simulated pilot and ATC and pressed the “Next” button to
continue the simulation. These pauses were in addition to the pauses used to collect
situation awareness data.
Summary
In the experimental protocol, pilots viewed eight basic flight maneuvers and three
complex approach-to-landing procedures. While viewing the simulations, pilots provided
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a running commentary of their thoughts. In addition, during preprogrammed pauses in the
simulation, pilots answered various questions based on Endsley’s three levels of situation
awareness (Endsley, 1995a). The questions were provided to the pilots either
immediately following the pause or after completing a working memory intensive
distracter task that required the use of working memory. The distracter task was designed
to prevent rehearsal of the current flight situation.
The running commentaries of the pilot’s thoughts were digitally recorded.
Responses and reaction times for the situation awareness questions were also captured.
Together these data were used to determine if LTWM can be considered a cognitive
construct that supports the development and maintenance of situation awareness and if
the development and maintenance of situation awareness is a function of differential
encoding of flight information.
Method
Participants
Ten instrument-rated pilots were recruited from local flight schools in the metro
Atlanta area. Each pilot was paid $50 for his participation in the 2-2.5 hour experiment.
In order to obtain information regarding piloting experience, a questionnaire was
administered to each pilot prior to starting the experiment. The complete questionnaire
can be found in Appendix C.

42

Apparatus
The experiment was programmed in Macromedia AuthorWare 7.0. It was
conducted on a Compaq R4000 series laptop with an ATI Radeon Express 200M
graphics card, AMD Athlon 64 processor, and 15.4 inch screen. Easy screen capture
video software was used to record 8 basic flight maneuvers and 3 instrument approaches
from IPT trainer version 7.0. A Sony digital recorder connected to a Plantronics headset
was used to record participant protocols.
Procedure
The experiment took place in two phases. During the first phase, participants were
instructed on the think aloud procedures. The instructions for think aloud procedures
were based on Ericsson and Simon's (1993, pp. 376-377) original instructions. Pilots
performed two practice trials prior to beginning the experimental trials. During and upon
completion of the practice trials, pilots had the opportunity to ask the experimenter
questions about the procedure. If necessary, the experimenter answered any questions.
The experimental trials followed. Each pilot viewed the eight basic and three complex
trials in the same order. After completing all of the trials, each pilot was provided a
debriefing form and paid for his participation.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the verbal protocols
and query data, we completed analyses at the question, trial, and individual participant
levels. Before reporting the statistical analyses, I will first describe process of coding
verbal protocol data, then turn to questions about the hierarchical nature of situation
awareness, followed by a discussion of the relationship between situation awareness and
LTWM.
Coding System
The digital recordings of pilot protocols obtained during the experimental trials
were first transcribed and then categorized. Each protocol segment was transcribed and
placed on a separate line. Pauses, phrases, and other syntactical markers defined each
segment. Pauses, pause duration, and other syntactical markers were not captured during
the transcription process.
The transcribed segments were categorized using a coding system derived from
the familiar mechanisms of LTWM and encoding commonalities of pilot training
techniques. Recall that the underlying characteristics of LTWM include quick recognition
of patterns and specific information, anticipation of the use of information, and the
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Table 3.1
Verbal Protocol Description, and Example for each Category
Categorization

Description

Example

Recognized
Pattern

Pilot identifies a flight
configuration.

“Coming down at 90 knots, 500 feet
per minute, needle is centered”

Recognized
Pattern with
Cue

Pilot identifies a “named”
flight configuration

“Coming down at 90 knots, 500 feet
per minute, needle is centered, looking
like a well-executed standard descent.”

Instrument
Read

Pilot references a specific
“Airspeed 75”
value and only the value (i.e.,
not part of a pattern)

Evaluation

Pilot references a changing
state.

“Airspeed coming down”

Intention

Pilot references a desired
state

“Looking for 90 knots”

Transformation Pilot converts the value of
the instrument into a status

“Airspeed is a little high”

Plan

Pilot makes reference to
upcoming steps.

“We’re approaching Dears intersection,
when we get there we should start our
descent to 1500”

Anticipation

Pilot makes reference to data
that should be considered
prior to an event occurring

“We’ll have to see how that cross-wind
is going to effect the approach”
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generation of contextual cues. Also recall that piloting an airplane involves instrument
interpretation to assess control movement impact, transformation of values to establish
their relationship to goals, and planning to stay ahead of the airplane. As a result, eight
protocol categorization rules were created. A summary of the categorization rules can be
found in Table 3.1.
Two researchers (i.e., the experimenter and a volunteer) coded the transcribed
protocols independently. Each transcribed segment was assigned to one of the eight
categories defined above with one exception: if the transcribed line was part of a pattern
or cued pattern it was only categorized once. For example, if the pilot said “Coming
down at 90 knots, 500 feet per minute, needle is centered” these three transcribed lines
were categorized as one pattern.
To validate the coding process, Cohen’s kappa statistic (Cohen, 1960) was
calculated as the measure of reliability. Cohen’s kappa measures consensus between two
raters after accounting for agreement that could occur by chance alone. Results of the
analysis indicate a high reliability, k = .80. According to Landis and Koch (1977) this
kappa value is interpreted as full agreement. Because of the high kappa value,
disagreements were not addressed. In the small number of cases where disagreements
occurred, the codes assigned by the primary researcher were used in the analyses.
Figure 3.1 indicates the percentage of each categorization. Looking at Figure 3.1,
it is clear that a majority of the transcribed segments were coded as evaluations,
instrument reads, and intentions. These three categorizations accounted for 73% of the
total transcribed segments. The remaining segments from most to least included:
transformations, plans, cued patterns, patterns, and anticipations.
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Figure 3.1 Overall percentage of transcribed segments assigned to each category.
Hierarchical Nature of Situation Awareness
The transcription data will be used again in a later section as a predictor of
situation awareness on the questions that pilots were asked. Let us first consider the
responses to query data at the individual item level and the trial level.
One of the goals of this research was to determine if situation awareness follows a
hierarchical structure. If situation awareness were hierarchical it would be expected that
Level 2 situation awareness requires Level 1 situation awareness and Level 3 situation
awareness requires Level 2 situation awareness.
Looking at the questions in Appendix A, level 2 questions (e.g., Select the answer
that best completes the sentence, “The aircraft is currently: Approaching the desired
heading”) should be based on information reported in level 1 questions (e.g., “What is
your current heading?”). In some cases, a level 2 question can be derived from multiple

47

level 1 questions. For example, if the pilot is answering the question “What is the status
of the flight situation with respect to the goal?” the pilot must know the current airspeed,
altitude and heading. Similarly, level 3 questions can be derived by knowing information
present in level 2 questions. For example, if the pilot is answering the question
“Approximately how long until you reach the goal airspeed?” the pilot should be able to
fill in the blanks to the following: “The plane is Below the desired goal airspeed and
Approaching.” Because of this relation between questions it was possible to perform a
question level analysis.
Two chi-square tests of independence were employed to examine whether or not
there was an association between levels of situation awareness, (i.e., between Levels 1
and 2 and Levels 2 and 3). As a result, two 2x2 contingency tables were created. (See
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.) The first cell (1,1) in Table 3.2 represents the number of
instances where the pilot correctly answered the Level 2 question and all of the necessary
Level 1 questions. The second cell (1,2) represents the number of instances where the
pilot incorrectly answered the Level 2 question but correctly answered all of the
necessary Level 1 questions. The third cell (2,1) represents the number of instances
where the pilot incorrectly answered one or more Level 1 questions necessary for
obtaining Level 2 situation awareness, but nonetheless answered the Level 2 questions
correctly. The final cell (2,2) represents the number of instances where both the Level 1
and Level 2 questions were answered incorrectly. Table 3.3 is similar. The only
difference is that the rows are represented by Level 2 questions and columns are
represented by Level 3 questions.
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Table 3.2
Relation between Level 1 and Level 2 Responses
Level 1 Question(s)
Correct
Level 1 Question(s)
Incorrect

Level 2 Question Correct

Level 2 Question Incorrect

328

148

12

32

Table 3.3
Relation between Level 2 and Level 3 Responses

Level 2 Question
Correct
Level 2 Question
Incorrect

Level 3 Question Correct

Level 3 Question Incorrect

260

80

47

133

Results of the analysis indicate there is a significant relation between Level 1 and
Level 2 situation awareness and between Level 2 and Level 3 situation awareness, χ2 (1,
n = 110) = 29.04, p < .01 and , χ2 (1, n = 110) = 121.35, p < .01, respectively. When
pilots correctly respond to Level 1 situation awareness questions that are related to
corresponding Level 2 situation awareness questions, they respond more accurately to the
respective Level 2 situation awareness questions. The same is true between Levels 2 and
3 situation awareness. Response accuracy to Level 2 questions increases accuracy to
respective Level 3 situation awareness questions.
Two values in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 deserve further discussion. The values of
interest reside in the lower-left cell of each table. They are of interest because these data
violate the hierarchical model: participants are answering a higher-level question
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correctly even though they missed a lower-level question. When considering the Level 1
to Level 2 and Level 2 to Level 3 relationships, this occurs in approximately 2% and 9%
of the total opportunities, respectively. One reason this may occur is pilots guessed the
correct response. This could explain the 2% value found between Level 1 and Level 2,
but seems less plausible for the 9% found when considering the Level 2 and Level 3
relationship. An alternative may be that pilots project the future status (i.e., obtain Level
3 situation awareness) and then look for evidence consistent with their projection. If this
explanation is correct the pilot could answer the Level 3 question but may potentially
confuse expected values with the current situation and as a result, answer the Level 2
question incorrectly.
Moving from an analysis at the question level to an aggregated trial level1 it
would be expected that response accuracy for Level 1 situation awareness would be the
highest followed by Level 2 and Level 3 situation awareness, respectively. To test this
hypothesis, a 2 x 3 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a planned
comparison using the repeated contrasts procedure was employed. The between items
factor was group (basic, complex) and the within item factor was question type (Level 1,
Level 2, Level 3). Mauchly’s test statistic indicated that the sphericity assumption was
not violated. Results of the analysis indicate a main effect of group F(1, 108) = 5.94, p <
.05, a main effect of question type F(2, 216) = 100.39, p < .01, and a group x question
type interaction F(2, 216) = 4.65, p < .05. Using η2 as a measure of effect size, the group,
question type, and interaction between group and question type accounted for 5.2%,
1
An analysis of variance was conducted to determine the effects of question type (multiple-choice or free response) on
accuracy. The analysis found no significant main effect of question type on response accuracy, nor was there any significant
interaction between question type and delay or question type and the different levels of situation awareness questions. As a result,
question type was dropped as a variable in all reported analyses.

50

47.1%, and 2.3% of the variability, respectively. The group effect was driven by higher
Level 2 and Level 3 response accuracies during the complex trials compared to the basic
trials. (See Figure 3.2.) This pattern is consistent with the hierarchical view of situation
awareness.
Planned comparisons revealed response accuracy was significantly greater for
Level 1 situation awareness compared to Level 2 F(1, 108) = 104.06, p < .01, η2 = 0.49.
In addition, Level 2 response accuracy was greater than Level 3 F(1, 108) = 10.67, p <
.01, η2 = 0.09. The group x question type interaction was primarily driven by a large
increase in Level 3 response accuracy in the complex trials relative to basic trials. In
addition, for the complex trials, there was a slight increase in Level 2 response accuracy
and a slight decrease in Level 1 response accuracy. (See Figure 3.2.)

Figure 3.2. Response accuracy for level 1, level 2, and level 3 situation awareness
questions as a function of complexity.
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Characteristics of Situation Awareness – Trial Level Analysis
Now we turn to the relationship between the verbal protocol data and query
performance. It is necessary to examine the protocol data in detail to see if pilot
comments from the protocol data can predict response accuracy of the queries. It is
expected that the familiar mechanisms of LTWM predict query response accuracy,
especially for Level 3 situation awareness. Level 3 situation awareness is of particular
importance because by definition and as the analyses above suggest, Level 3 requires
both Level 1 and Level 2 situation awareness.
A summary of descriptive statistics for the different categories of protocols for the
basic and complex trials is provided below. (See Table 3.4 and Table 3.5.) Table 3.4
presents descriptive statistics for basic trials, while Table 3.5 presents descriptive
statistics for complex trials. Note that the average frequency of every code type is higher
in Table 3.5 than in Table 3.4. This increase is due to the increased maneuvering
associated with the instrument approach procedure and the extended duration of the
complex trials. For the basic trials, pilots were given a starting situation and specific goal.
Each trial included approximately 90 seconds of simulated flight. For the complex trials
the goal was to fly the approach; a situation requiring several goals rather than a single
goal. Each complex trial had over 10 minutes of simulated flight.
Familiar Mechanisms of LTWM and Pilot Encoding
In order to better understand the interrelationships of the extracted variables
derived from the familiar mechanisms of LTWM and encoding commonalities of pilot
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Table 3.4
Descriptive Statistics for Basic Trial Verbal Protocol Categories
Category
Patterns
Cued Patterns
Anticipations
Reads
Evaluations
Intentions
Plans
Transformations

Standard
n Mean Deviation Minimum
80 0.26
0.44
0
80 0.99
0.41
0
80 0.43
0.50
0
80 4.74
1.26
2
80 5.13
1.44
2
80 4.76
1.23
3
80 2.04
0.85
1
80 3.26
1.03
1

Maximum
1
2
1
8
8
7
4
6

Table 3.5
Descriptive Statistics for Complex Trial Verbal Protocol Categories
Category
Patterns
Cued Patterns
Anticipations
Reads
Evaluations
Intentions
Plans
Transformations

n
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30

Mean
03.50
05.53
02.60
38.83
48.23
26.60
11.70
14.10

Standard
Deviation
1.31
2.49
0.89
6.82
6.44
5.71
2.32
2.70

Minimum
1
1
1
20
35
16
8
10

Maximum
6
10
4
51
61
39
17
21

training techniques, a principal component analysis was conducted on the eight coding
categories.
As mentioned above, there are large differences in mean levels, standard
deviations, and data ranges between the basic and complex trials. Thus it was necessary
to transform all data to help equate mean levels, standard deviations, and ranges.
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Two sets of z-transforms were performed. The first standardized data from the
basic trials and the second from complex trials. Separate transforms were performed on
the complex trials because of the differences in data between trials previously mentioned.
After standardization, the eight variables mentioned above were submitted to a principal
components analysis with varimax rotation. The resulting analysis produced three factors
with eigenvalues greater than 1 that accounted for a large percentage of variance in these
data; over 63%.

Table 3.6
Component Loadings after Varimax Rotation
Factor 1
Component 1: Strategy
Intentions
Evaluations
Plans
Anticipations

Factor 2

0.804
0.785
0.695
0.570

Component 2: Schema Recognition
Patterns
Cued Patterns

0.237

-0.228

-0.886
0.803

Component 3: Concise Conversions
Reads
Transformations

0.397

Factor 3

0.215
0.333

-0.837
0.587

The first component accounted for 29.7% of the variance and included variables
with positive loadings on the intentions, evaluations, plans, and anticipations variables.
Three of the variables: intentions, evaluations, and plans, are derived from the control and
performance and primary and supporting pilot training methods described earlier. The
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final variable, anticipations, is derived from the familiar mechanisms of LTWM.
Component 1 was labeled strategy because each of the variables is related to either the
current or future goals. Intentions and evaluations relate to the current goal whereas plans
and anticipations relate to future goals.
The second factor accounted for 19.5% of the variance and included two
variables: patterns and cued patterns. Both of these variables are derived from the
familiar mechanisms of LTWM. Specifically these variables are consistent with the
recognition of patterns and association of cues to information. There was a high negative
load on the patterns variable and positive load on the cued patterns variable. The opposite
loadings signify the relevance of identifying and recognizing information with respect to
a goal. Explicitly recognizing the pattern is clearly different than simply obtaining the
relevant information. Together these variables characterize pilots with a purpose. They
are obtaining information from the instruments to fulfill a specific need: to compare an
ideal to current situation. This component was labeled schema recognition.
The last component accounted for 14.2% of the variance and included a high
negative loading on instrument reads and a positive loading on transformations. Both of
these variables are derived from the aforementioned training methods and together
describe a pilot that is obtaining only necessary relevant information and associating the
information to current goals. Specifically, the negative loading on the instrument reads
variable suggests there is a lack of instrument reads. This means the instrument reads are
part of a pattern and that the pilots are obtaining flight information with a goal in mind.
The positive loading on the transformation variable suggests pilots are converting values.
Converting the instrument value to a status with respect to the goal may allow the pilot to
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fine-tune the airplanes flight configuration. This is consistent with Norman’s (1998) idea
that an approximate range rather than a precise value is more relevant. The range with
respect to the goal can facilitate performance because it gives the pilot the ability to adapt
to the current situation. This variable was labeled concise conversion. A summary of the
three components is provided in Table 3.6.
Predicting Levels of Situation Awareness
Using both the protocol data and the query data, it is possible to examine how the
encoding of flight information impacts the building and maintenance of flight situation
awareness. Three hierarchical (sequential) regression analyses were computed to test
whether or not the factors retained from the protocol analysis and the preceding levels of
situation scores could predict Level 1, 2, and 3 situation awareness. Hierarchical
regression analyses examine the effect of one variable while controlling for the effects of
remaining variables (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
For the first regression analysis (i.e., predicting Level 1 situation awareness) the
variables were entered in the following order: concise conversion, strategy, and schema
recognition. Concise conversion was entered first because the factor included variables
that appear consistent with perceiving and beginning to comprehend the environment
(i.e., Levels 1 and 2 situation awareness). The second variable entered in the analysis was
schema recognition. This variable was entered second because the variables contributing
to this factor appear to relate to Level 2 situation awareness. Finally, the strategy factor
was entered. The strategy factor appears to be consistent with projection (i.e., Level 3
situation awareness) as it includes variables such as plans and anticipations. The second
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and third hierarchical regressions that were conducted used the same order with one
exception. In the prediction of Level 2 situation awareness, the Level 1 situation
awareness score was entered into the regression as the first variable. This was done
because Level 1 should contribute to the development of Level 2 situation awareness. In
the final regression predicting Level 3 situation awareness, Level 1 was entered first
followed by Level 2 and then the factor scores were entered as described above.
A summary of results is provided below. (See Table 3.7.) The complete
correlation matrix containing all criterion and predictor variables is presented in
Appendix D. Looking at Table 3.7, the component factor labeled concise conversion
predicted Level 1 situation awareness. Level 2 situation awareness was not predicted by
Level 1 situation awareness or any of the retained component factor scores. Finally both
Levels 1 and 2 situation awareness as well as the strategy factor best predicted level 3
situation awareness.
Question and Trial Level Analysis – Summary and Discussion
The question and trial level data has provided some interesting insights into the
hierarchical nature of situation awareness, general characteristics of situation awareness,
and the interrelationship between known familiar mechanisms of LTWM and encoding
driven by pilot training techniques. What follows is a discussion of the question and triallevel findings.
Regarding the hierarchical nature of situation awareness, the question level
analysis, obtained from the query responses during the pause and the most precise data
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Table 3.7
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses
Criterion Variable
Predictor
Variable

F Model

R2

Inc. R2

B

F Change

18.86

0.15

0.15

-0.03

18.86**

9.37
7.29

0.15
0.17

0.00
0.02

-0.00
-0.01

0.06
2.81

Level 1
Concise
Conversion
Schema
recognition
Strategy

2.52

0.02

0.02

-0.28

2.52

1.25

0.02

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.60
1.22

0.04
0.04

0.02
0.00

-0.02
-0.01

2.26
0.11

Level 1
Level 2
Concise
Conversion
Schema
recognition
Strategy
** p < .01

6.64
6.82

0.06
0.11

0.06
0.06

-0.27
0.23

6.64*
6.65*

4.52

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.03

3.90
7.52

0.13
0.27

0.02
0.14

-0.02
-0.06

1.94
19.28**

Level 1 Situation awareness
Concise
Conversion
Schema
recognition
Strategy
Level 2 Situation awareness

Level 3 Situation awareness

Note. * p < .05.

58

collected during this study, demonstrated a significant relationship between Level 1 and
Level 2 situation awareness and Level 2 and Level 3 situation awareness. These results
provide significant support for Endsley's claim of the hierarchical nature of situation
awareness: Level 1 situation awareness is needed for Level 2 situation awareness and
level 2 situation awareness is needed for level 3 situation awareness.
Trial level analyses solidified this finding. Recall that each trial was either basic
or complex and included queries specific to each of Endsley’s (1995a) three levels of
situation awareness. The hierarchical model predicts that level 2 SA can be worse, but no
better than Level 1 SA, whereas level 3 SA can be worse than level 2 SA and Level 1 SA,
but no better. This is precisely the pattern that was found. Previous research has not
directly examined the hierarchical nature of flight situation awareness. Collectively these
results support Endsley's analysis of three levels of situation awareness. Not all
definitions of situation awareness reflect this hierarchical character. For example Sarter
and Woods (1991) definition consists primarily of knowledge integration. Adams,
Tenney, and Pew (1995) define situation awareness as a product and process. Each of
these definitions focuses on one or two aspects of situation awareness, respectively.
One surprising result was the group x question type interaction at the trial level.
Level 1 response accuracy decreases slightly from basic to complex trials. However,
Level 2 and Level 3 response accuracies indicate an increase from basic to complex
trials. One explanation may be that the complex trials force pilots to project the future
situation in order to plan ahead for the next self-guided goal. In the basic trials, there was
only one goal to accomplish before the trial was completed.
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The trial level analysis also indicates that overall pilots appear to leverage both
familiar mechanism of LTWM and encoding based on pilot training techniques. As trials
became longer in duration and more complex a review of the descriptive summaries of
categorized protocols show an increased use of both. More interesting are the results of
the factor analysis that was based on the verbal protocol data. The factor analysis
revealed three component factors that were labeled strategy, schema recognition, and
concise conversion.
The strategy component, which accounted for the greatest amount of variance of
all the factors, consisted of both familiar mechanisms of LTWM and encoding based on
typical pilot training. The remaining factors, schema recognition and concise conversion,
included variables unique to LTWM and pilot training, respectively.
Utilizing both the protocol and query data, it was possible to examine whether or
not the verbal protocol data and SAGAT data summarizing situation awareness at early
levels of situation awareness could predict later levels of situation awareness. The
concise conversion variable predicted Level 1 situation awareness question response
accuracy. Given that Level 1 situation awareness consists of perceiving cues in the
environment, the finding that the concise conversion factor predicts Level 1 situation
awareness is rational because pilots are seeking relevant information in the environment.
The schema recognition factor, which characterizes pilots as having a purpose of
comparing an ideal to current situation, failed to predict any of the levels of situation
awareness. As a result the exact role of schema recognition in building and maintaining
situation awareness cannot be determined. Schema recognition should have predicted
Level 2 situation awareness. Level 2 situation awareness consists of integrating
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background knowledge with the current information in order to comprehend the situation.
Thus the acknowledgement of patterns should be related to Level 2 situation awareness.
Schema recognition may very well play a more significant role in nonstandard flight
situations. All of our trials were standard flight maneuvers and standard instrument
approaches.
The strategy component was a predictor of Level 3 situation awareness. One
interpretation of this result is that typical pilot training techniques naturally extend into
the familiar mechanisms of LTWM, especially as they relate to obtaining the ability to
project and plan ahead; the highest level of situation awareness. In order for pilots to
figure out where they want to be, they have to first figure out where they are and what
variables are affecting them now and will affect them in the future. They can then
determine the best approach to get to their goal and look for cues consistent with the goal.
Two additional predictor variables of Level 3 situation awareness included Level
1 and Level 2 response accuracies. These data are continued support of the hierarchical
nature of situation awareness.
Finally, although the aforementioned results have supported the nature of
Endsley’s (1995a) hierarchical model, one aspect of these data appear to conflict. The
concise conversion factor predicted Level 1 situation awareness question response
accuracy. Therefore, it should have predicted Levels 2 and Levels 3 situation awareness
response accuracy. According to the hierarchical model and based on the question level
analysis that revealed a significant relationship between the different levels of situation
awareness, Level 2 and Level 3 situation awareness both require Level 1 situation
awareness. This conflicting evidence is puzzling and remains unexplained. It is also
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puzzling why there were no predictors of Level 2 situation awareness. One explanation
may be that the constituent cognitive processes associated with building Level 2 situation
awareness were not vocalized during the unfolding situations. If this were true then Level
1 situation awareness alone would not necessarily predict Level 2 situation awareness
because it may be that the combination of additional processes and Level 1 situation
awareness are necessary.
Characteristics of Situation Awareness – Participant Level Analysis
The previous analyses utilized data at the question and trial levels to gain insight
into the hierarchical nature of situation awareness and the role LTWM and traditional
pilot encoding processes has in building and maintaining situation awareness. Additional
insight can be obtained from analyses at the participant level.
The participant level analyses below examine whether or not characteristics
associated with LTWM are consistent with the building and maintaining of situation
awareness. Of specific interest is pilot ability to answer situation awareness questions in
the delay and no delay conditions. If LTWM is being utilized, situation awareness scores
from the delay condition should equal scores from the no-delay condition. Of additional
interest is the amount of time it takes a pilot to respond to the first question after a delay.
If pilots utilize retrieval structures, the amount of time required to respond to the first
situation awareness questions after a delay is imposed would be longer than when no
delay is included. Finally, it is necessary to determine if there were differences in
response accuracy based on the type of information (e.g., heading, altitude, airspeed) that
was being queried.
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Response Accuracy for Delay and No Delay Condition
To determine whether or not situation awareness scores obtained during the
pauses in the flight simulations varied in the delay and no delay conditions, a 2x3x2
repeated measures ANOVA with planned comparisons using the repeated contrasts
procedure was employed. The factors included the presence or absence of a delay prior to
the pilot responding to questions (delay or no delay), type of question (level 1, level 2, or
level 3), and trial complexity (basic or complex). Mauchly’s test statistic revealed that the
sphericity assumption for question type was violated. As a result, the Greenhouse-Geisser
adjustment was used in the analysis. Results of the repeated measures ANOVA showed
no effect of delay F(1,9) = 1.18, ns; a significant effect of question type F(1.2, 11) =
31.31, p < .01; and no effect of complexity F(1,9) = 1.19, ns. Using η2 as a measure of
effect size, delay, question type, and complexity accounted for 0%, 60%, and 0% of the
variability, respectively. It is important to note that the nonsignificant effect of delay is
consistent with a LTWM explanation pilot encoding of flight situation awareness
information.
The planned comparisons revealed that response accuracy to Level 1 situation
awareness was greater than Level 2 F(1,9) = 89.65, p < .01, η2 = 0.49. Response
accuracies between Level 2 and Level 3 situation awareness did not differ significantly
F(1,9) = 3.19, ns, η2 = 0.04. There was a significant complexity x question type
interaction F(2,18) = 3.56, p < .05, η2 = 0.01. The interaction was driven by an increase
in Level 3 response accuracy for complex trials compared to basic trials while both Level
1 and Level 2 response accuracies indicate slight decreases for complex trials compared
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to basic trials. The remaining interactions were not statistically significant. These results
are consistent with the trial and question level analyses.

Figure 3.3 Response time to first question as a function of delay.
Response Latency
Continuing with the participant level analysis, a paired-sample t test was
conducted to determine if data in this study are consistent with pilot utilization of
retrieval structures. If retrieval structures were utilized, it would be expected that the time
to answer the first question after a delay would take longer than when no delay was
included because the pilot would need to activate the retrieval cue associated with the
information of interest. Results of the paired-samples t test indicate a significant effect of

64

delay t(9) = -5.45, p < .01. Looking at Figure 3.2 it is clear that the time to respond to the
first question in the delay condition is longer than the no delay condition.
Categorized Queries
The last participant level analysis involves the questions that the pilots were asked
to answer. The questions were categorized into five classes of information: heading,
airspeed, altitude, control and pattern. (See Appendix A for a complete list of questions
and associated categorization.) This categorization allows for an examination of whether
or not there were differences in response accuracy based on the type of information (e.g.,
heading, altitude, airspeed) that was being queried. Because there was no significant
effect of complexity or delay, these data were collapsed across both measures.
Additionally, because not all questions were incorporated into each of the different levels
of situation awareness, these data were collapsed across levels of situation awareness as
well.
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine if response
accuracy differed based on question categorization. The within subject factor was
category and had five levels (Airspeed, Altitude, Heading, Control, and Position).
Mauchly’s test statistic revealed that the sphericity assumption for category was violated.
As a result, the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used in the analysis. Results of the
analysis indicate a main effect of category F(1.7, 15) = 21.96, p < .01. Using η2 as a
measure of effect size, category accounted for 71% of the variability. Table 3.8 shows the
mean accuracy for each of the different categories. Looking at Table 3.8, questions
related to position were answered most accurately followed by control, airspeed, heading,
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and altitude. Pairwise comparisons utilizing a Bonferroni correction reveal that response
accuracy for position questions is significantly greater than response accuracy for
airspeed, altitude, and heading related questions. Response accuracy for control
questions is significantly greater than altitude and heading related questions. Finally,
airspeed questions are answered more accurately than altitude related questions.

Table 3.8
Summary of Category Response Accuracy
Category

Mean (percent correct)

SD

Position
Control
Airspeed
Heading
Altitude

93
84
76
73
68

17
7
6
4
3

Pilot Characteristics
Pilots with varying experience were recruited for this experiment. (See Appendix
C for the complete questionnaire.) Experience is often associated with the total number of
flight hours logged as pilot in command. Looking at Table 3.9, there is a large range in
data related to the various time measures. Experience is also associated with the
development of LTMW because individuals must acquire appropriate background
knowledge or order to be able to quickly identify patterns and anticipate the use of
information. It was therefore expected that the number of flight hours logged would at a
minimum correlate with measures of situation awareness.
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Interestingly, there were no significant correlations between any of the measures
of flight hours logged or any of the other variables captured in the preexperimental
questionnaire and measurements of the different levels of situation awareness. (See
Appendix C.) One interpretation of this result is that all of the pilots in this study have
acquired enough of the skill to complete the tasks. All of the pilots in this study were
current (i.e., they could legally fly) and instrument-rated (i.e., they received instruction
and passed a test qualifying them to fly solely via instruments). Perhaps if student pilots
currently working toward an instrument rating were included, a significant correlation
between hours and situation awareness measurements would be found.
Table 3.9
Descriptive Statistics of Key Questionnaire Data

Questionnaire Data
Total Hours
Total Instrument
Time
Total Actual Time
Instrument Time
Last 90 days
Total Time Last 90
days

Min
240.0
50.0

Max
1700.0
160.0

Mean
669.5
89.5

SD
603.9
44.2

3.0

40.0

20.6

11.9

0.0

6.0

2.4

2.0

0.0

75.0

24.8

30.7

Participant Level Analysis – Summary and Discussion
Various participant level analyses were conducted to determine if these data are
consistent with characteristics associated with LTWM. In addition there was an interest
in better understanding pilot processing of different categories of flight information.
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Response accuracy in the delay and no delay conditions did not differ
significantly. This is consistent with long-term storage of information rather than storage
in volatile working memory. The additional time it took to respond to questions after a
delay is consistent with the hypothesis that LTWM supports the building and
maintenance of situation awareness. In order to utilize a retrieval structure for the purpose
of responding to the situation awareness questions, pilots would have to activate and
search the retrieval structure to obtain the required information. Pilots took approximately
2.5 seconds longer to respond to the first question after a delay compared to when no
delay was imposed.
These data also indicate that pilot’s process position and control information to a
greater extent than general airspeed, heading, and altitude. One reason may be that these
pilots utilize the control and performance training methodology. That is, pilots may
process their position in space and then set their pitch, bank, and power. Performance is
then monitored and controls are tweaked to maximize performance. Alternatively, it may
be that position and control information is of greater importance than airspeed, heading
and altitude information when it comes to building and maintaining situation awareness.
Finally, data collected in the preexperiment questionnaire did not correlate with
measurements of flight situation awareness. One potential explanation is that the pilots in
this study all had the requisite knowledge to complete the experimental tasks.
Summary
Data were analyzed at question, trial and participant levels to examine the
hierarchical nature of situation awareness and whether or not the familiar mechanisms of
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LTWM support the building and maintenance of situation awareness or if other encoding
processes better characterize the building and maintenance of situation awareness.
Understanding characteristics of pilot information processing as it relates to specific
categories of flight information was also of interest.
Utilizing data obtained via the queries, analyses at the question, trial, and
participant levels were consistent with a hierarchical definition of situation awareness.
Question level analyses revealed that the presence of level 1 situation awareness
increased the likelihood of obtaining level 2 situation awareness for a given question
type. The same was true when examining the relationship between Level 2 and Level 3
situation awareness. At both the trial and participant levels, response accuracies to the
queries varied as a function of question type. That is, Level 1 questions were answered
correctly most often followed by Level 2 questions and lastly Level 3 questions.
To distinguish between LTWM processing of flight information and other
encoding processes, pilot protocol data were transcribed, categorized, and submitted to a
principal component analysis. The analysis resulted in three components that were
labeled strategy, schema recognition, and concise conversion. The strategy component
consisted of one of the familiar mechanisms of LTWM (i.e., anticipation of information)
as well as encodings associated with pilot training techniques (i.e., intentions, evaluation,
and plans). The schema recognition component consisted of variables specific to the
familiar mechanism of LTWM whereas the concise conversion component consisted of
variables specific to alternative encoding of information. Together these three
components shed some light on pilot information processing. It appears that pilot training
techniques are consistent with the development of LTWM. There appears to be a natural
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tie between acquiring LTWM skills and current training techniques. Together they help
derive the highest level of situation awareness.
Utilizing both protocol and query data, it was found that two of the three
component scores were predictors of the different levels of situation awareness.
Specifically the concise conversion component predicted Level 1 response accuracy and
the strategy component predicted Level 3 response accuracy. None of the components
predicted Level 2 response accuracy. Given a hierarchical definition of situation
awareness, it was expected that any predictor of Level 1 situation awareness would
predict Levels 2 and 3 as well. This was not the case and is currently left unexplained.
However, it was found that both Level 1 and Level 2 situation awareness help predict
Level 3 situation awareness. The evidence is in favor of a hierarchical model.
Participant level analyses provided evidence consistent with LTWM processing of
flight information. There was no difference in response accuracy in the delay condition.
Additionally, when the delay condition was employed, participants took approximately
2.5 seconds longer to respond to the first question.
The participant level analysis also shed some light on pilot information processing
in general. Overall it appears that pilots focus on position and control information more
so than specific heading, altitude, and airspeed. These data are consistent with a control
and performance instrument flying technique and noncategorical representation of flight
instrument values.
Finally, there was no correlation between questionnaire data that captured pilot
flight experience and flight situation awareness. It is expected that all pilots had requisite
knowledge for task completion. This may reflect a ceiling effect due to the fact that all of
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our pilots were experienced and had a current instrument flight rating. Alternatively, the
lack of correlation may be a result of the small number of participants in this study.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present research contributes to our understanding of the hierarchical nature of
situation awareness and how pilots overcome the inherent limits of human information
processing models to build and maintain situation awareness. What follows is a
discussion of how our findings support LTWM skill as a cognitive construct that supports
performance in dynamic nonsymbolic domains. In addition, we discuss potential
strategies for acquiring the necessary skills to build and maintain situation awareness and
how our results support these strategies.
One approach to better understanding the obtained results is to discuss the results
in terms of well-understood theoretical claims. Of particular relevance is Kintsch’s
(1998) theory of text comprehension. It is relevant because the principles of LTWM can
be explained using text comprehension as an example.
According to Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) a long-term memory representation of
text consists of linguistic surface structures based on current text, organization of the text,
and the reader’s background knowledge. To comprehend text, this representation must be
accessible to the reader. Having access allows the reader to expand the representation by
reading new texts. This representation is stored in long-term memory as “a fully
interpreted, contextually integrated text representation” (p. 229). New elements of the
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text encountered by the reader are necessarily connected to the current representation
stored in long-term memory. Connections between current text and the long-term
memory representation act as retrieval cues and form LTWM while the structure and
reader’s mental representation of text together forms a retrieval structure.
As just mentioned, principles associated with text comprehension are tied to
LTWM theory. A second reason why Kintsch’s (1998) theory of text comprehension is
relevant to understand the obtained results is that Kintch’s theory has been expanded
beyond text comprehension. Specifically it has been used to explain the solution of
simple computing tasks (Mannes & Kintsch, 1991), completing the Tower of Hanoi task
(Schmalhofer & Tschaitschian, 1993), understanding human-computer interaction skills
(e.g., Doane, McNamara, Kintsch, Polson, & Clawson, 1992; Kitajima & Polson, 1995;
Mannes & Doane, 1991), predicting the impact of instructions on computer user
performance (Sohn & Doane, 1997), and predicting novice and expert pilot action
planning (Doane & Sohn, 2000).
Finally, Durso, Rawson, and Girotto (2007) have proposed a model to further the
understanding of environments that are in a constant state of change (i.e., dynamic
situations) based on Kintsch’s theory. Thus it is reasonable to consider comprehension as
a starting point to understanding these results.
As mentioned above, to comprehend text the reader must form a multilevel
structural representation of the text in long-term memory. In Kintsch’s theory, a longterm memory representation of text includes three levels; surface, textbase, and situation
model. Surface level representation consists of words and grammatical structures. The
textbase consists of semantic information and the situation model consists of integrated
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information extracted from the text along with an individual’s background knowledge.
The derived long-term memory structure must be expanded and integrated with new
information if the reader is to comprehend the text.
Recently, Durso and colleagues (2007) have proposed a comprehension-based
model of dynamic situations much in line with Kintsch’s theory of comprehension. They
propose that surface level representations in dynamic environments are analogous to
surface level representation in text comprehension. Whereas surface levels in text
comprehension consist of words and grammatical relationships, the surface levels of
dynamic environments include “the objects in the environment and the structural
relationships between them” (p. 173). In Kintsch’s (1998) model, the textbase in text
comprehension consists of semantic information derived from concepts and ideas
specified in the text. Similarly, Durso and colleagues posit that comprehension of
dynamic environments include an “eventbase” representative of semantic information
derived from the surface level input. That is, values are assigned relevant meaning to the
current situation. Finally, just like text comprehension, the situation model consists of the
integration of previously derived semantic information with prior knowledge to form a
more coherent understanding of the situation.
Our data are consistent with a comprehension-based model of dynamic
environments. The comprehension-based model of dynamic environments proposed by
Durso and colleagues (2007) is very much hierarchical just as situation awareness
appears hierarchical. Our data indicate that when pilots accurately respond to Level 1
situation awareness questions they are more likely to accurately comprehend the
situation. That is, they are more likely to obtain Level 2 situation awareness. Pilots
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correctly answered both Level 1 and Level 2 questions over 63% of the time. In addition,
pilots failed to answer both questions an additional 6% of the time.
The same is true for the transition between level 2 and Level 3 situation
awareness. When pilots accurately respond to a level 2 questions, the likelihood of the
pilot being able to project the future situation, i.e., obtain Level 3 situation awareness, is
greatly enhanced. Pilots correctly answered both Level 2 and Level 3 questions 50% of
the time and failed to answer both questions an additional 25% of the time.
These data also indicate that response accuracies to Level 1 situation awareness
questions are greater than Level 2, which are greater than Level 3. Together these data
support the hierarchical nature of situation awareness and dynamic environments in
general.
According to Kintsch’s (1998) theory, surface level information is not sufficient
for adequate comprehension of text. Connections within and between sentences must also
be represented. Similarly, in dynamic environments such as piloting a plane, surface level
information alone is insufficient. Our data indicate that pilots actively convert
information from a specific value to a more general meaning with respect to a given goal.
This transformation is tied to the prediction of Level 1 situation awareness, perception of
cues in the environment. Further, it is consistent with the surface level and eventbase of
dynamic environments. To obtain a surface level representation of the environment,
pilots must perceive objects in the environment. Perceived objects must be connected to
current goals and other objects. The resulting connection is the eventbase.
Additional evidence supporting a comprehension-based model of dynamic
environments exists in our results comparing accuracy and latency of trials incorporating
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a delay to trials without a delay. Recall that accuracy remained virtually identical and
latency significantly increased when a delay was presented prior to answering the
question. Also recall that during the delay condition pilots were asked to complete a
working memory intensive task. These results are consistent with evidence demonstrating
that a STM buffer (working memory capacity) is not needed for comprehension (Fischer
& Glanzer, 1986; Glanzer, Fisher, & Dorfman B., 1984). In these studies, participants
read a short text and were interrupted after every sentence using various activities,
spanning various lengths of time. After reading the text, participants answered a series of
comprehension questions. Performance on the comprehension questions was not affected
by the various interruptions. In addition, the time to read the first sentence increased after
the disruption.
LTWM theory explains the above-mentioned phenomenon because according to
LTWM theory, readers can rapidly encode and retrieve information into and from longterm memory. After the various delays, meaningful sentences activate retrieval structures
that allow the reader to comprehend the text. This same process appears to support the
development of situation awareness as well. Our data support rapid encoding and
retrieval of flight information into and from long-term memory. Accuracy did not
diminish when a delay was imposed. In addition, there was longer response latency when
pilots answered the question after the delay.
In LTWM theory the mechanism for encoding information into long-term
memory is via retrieval structures, elaborated structures, or a merger of the retrieval and
elaborated structures. Given the results of our protocol analysis, and given that obtaining
Level 3 situation awareness is the ultimate goal, one explanation of how pilots utilize
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LTWM to build and maintain situation awareness is through the use of a retrieval
structure where the pilot’s mental representation of the situation is driven by strategy.
The obtained data show that anticipating the use of information; a familiar mechanism of
LTWM, in conjunction with desired, changing, and future states of the aircraft predict
Level 3 situation awareness. This is consistent with a comprehension-based model of
dynamic environments. Specifically, the utilization of preexisting strategies is tied to the
development of the situation model in dynamic situations.
Limitations
This research is limited to routine flight situations where schemas are readily
available. Experienced instrument rated pilots are very familiar with the situations
presented. Thus they had a good opportunity to leverage their experience.
One way to extend this research would be to include nonroutine situations where
pilots would be forced outside of the traditional flight maneuvers. They would then have
to utilize their background knowledge to piece together the solution. This would further
demonstrate the need and use of the situation model in dynamic environments as well.
Pilot Training
Learning to fly via instruments can be broken down into three stages (Butcher,
2007). The first stage is instrument scan and interpretation and aircraft control. The
second stage is radio navigation. Finally, the third stage is en route flying. The results of
this research are directly relevant to the first stage of instrument training; the most critical
but often most neglected stage due its seemingly simplistic nature.
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Our findings suggest that pilot training can be improved by exposing pilots to
goal-driven processing of information. Specifically, our data suggest it is important to
read instruments with a purpose and relate the instrument read to a specific goal. The
verbal protocol data collected in this study were used to predict Level 1 situation
awareness. Goal-directed processing of the evolving situation drove this prediction.
The development of Level 1 situation awareness is critical as our data also
indicate that Level 1 situation awareness supports the development of Level 2 situation
awareness and Level 2 supports the development of Level 3 situation awareness. Our data
also indicate there is a value in focusing on instrument interpretation and planning.
Specifically, pilots should focus on desired, changing, and planning of future states. The
verbal protocols indicate that together these variables predict pilot ability to build and
maintain Level 3 situation awareness.
One training technique to consider would be event-based training that frequently
requests and captures pilots evaluation and assessment of the state with respect to the
goal. This technique would influence pilot encoding skills and facilitate the development
of situation awareness.
Conclusion
The present research had both theoretical and applied objectives. Our theoretical
objective included understanding how pilots overcome the inherent limits of human
information processing models to build and maintain situation awareness. This objective
was achieved by examining the relation between situation awareness and the familiar
mechanisms of LTWM and additional pilot encoding processes derived from pilot
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training techniques. In so doing, we were able to provide direct evidence that supports a
hierarchical model of situation awareness. Further we were able to provide evidence that
suggests LTWM can be extended to dynamic nonsymbolic domains. Specifically, our
data support a comprehension-based model of dynamic domains (Durso, Rawson, &
Girotto, 2007).
From an applied perspective we were interested in providing some insight into the
necessary skills required for building and maintaining flight situation awareness.
Specifically we were interested in examining whether or not encoding of flight
information is indicative of the ability to build and maintain flight situation awareness.
Our data indicate there are key aspects of pilot training (e.g., interpretation and planning)
that facilitate the development of situation awareness. Training tools focusing on these
skills may help provide safer skies.
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APPENDIX B
APPROACH PLATES
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Figure B.1 Complex trial VOR/DME RWY 27
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Figure B.2 Complex trial ILS RWY 6
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Figure B.3 Complex trial ILS RWY 7
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Extending Long Term Working Memory Theory to Dynamic Domains:
The Nature of Retrieval Structures in Situation Awareness
The purpose of this questionnaire is to ascertain your aviation background. We
are interested in your current flight status as well as your previous aviation experience.
Please answer the questions as accurately as possible. No individual information gathered
in this study will be disclosed to anyone other Mark Jodlowski and his collaborators.
Note- this page will be destroyed when you complete (or withdraw from) the experiment,
and at that time your name will not be linked with your subject id.
Participant number:
1. Name __________________________
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Participant number:
3. Age ______
4. Gender:

Male____
Female____

5. Education:

High school____
2 Year College____
4 Year College BA or BS____
Post Graduate Degree____

6. Certificates and Ratings (Airplanes, Helicopters, Gliders, others). Please check
certificates and ratings you have obtained. The default is assumed to be airplanes, please
indicate if certificates/ratings are for helicopters, gliders, etc.
Certificates

Ratings

STUDENT______
PRIVATE______

Approx. Month/Year
_______

Single Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Multi Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Instrument
_______
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_______

Certificates

Ratings

COMMERCIAL______

Single Engine

Approx.Month/Year

Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Multi Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Instrument
_______

_______

Multi Engine - Center line (Military)

FLIGHT
INSTRUCTORS______

Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Single Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Multi Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Instrument
_______
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_______

Certificates

Ratings

Approx.Month/Year

Multi Engine - Center line

ATP______

Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Single Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Multi Engine
Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______

Instrument
_______

_______

Multi Engine - Center line

Certificates
OTHERS

Ratings

Land _______

_______

Sea

_______

_______
Approx. Month/Year

_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
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7. Fill in the appropriate flight hours.
a) Total time ___________
b) Total instrument time (hood and actual instrument) ___________
c) Total actual instrument time ___________
d) Total ground trainer and simulator time ___________
e) Total instrument time, last 90 days (hood and actual instrument) ___________
f) Total time, last 90 days ___________
8. Please indicate below, with an "X" the types of aircraft you have flown. If you have
flown any aircraft type that is not listed below, please list the aircraft in the "Other"
category.
AIRCRAFT TYPES
A. SINGLE ENGINE - TRAINER
Archer________

C-182_________

Cherokee_______

Tomahawk______

BE-19/23______

C-150/152______

Tampico________

Warrior________

Other________________________________________________________________

B. SINGLE ENGINE - COMPLEX TRAINER (RETRACTABLE)
Tobago______

Arrow______

Other________________________________________________________________
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C. SINGLE ENGINE - ADVANCE COMPLEX TRAINER
(RETRACTABLE - HIGH POWER)
Bonanza______

C-210______

Lance_______

Malibu_________

Other________________________________________________________________

D. SINGLE ENGINE - TAIL DRAGGER
A75N-1______

Cub______

Decathlon______

Citabaria_______

Cap 10______

Other______________________________________________

E. MULTI ENGINE - LIGHT
BE-76______

Other______________________________________________

F. MULTI ENGINE - MEDIUM
Navajo______

Baron______

Seneca______

Aztec__________

C-310______

Other______________________________________________

G. TURBO PROP
King Air______

Other______________________________________________

H. MULTI ENGINE - HEAVY
____________________________________________________________________
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I. SINGLE ENGINE - JET
F-16D______

Other______________________________________________

J. MULTI ENGINE - JET
T-41A______

T-41B______

T-41C______

T-37A______

T-37B______

F-4C_______

YF-4E_________

Other________________________________________________________________

9. Please indicate below, with an "X", the number of different airports you have
flown into.
a) Large (i.e., Atlanta International, Birmingham International, Nashville, etc.)
0

_____

5-8

_____

1

_____

8-10

_____

2

_____

10-15 _____

3-5

_____

More than 15 _____

b) Small (i.e., Kennesaw Regional, Columbus, etc.)
0

_____

8-10

_____

30-40 _____

1

_____

10-15 _____

40-50 _____

2

_____

15-20 _____

More than 50_____

3-5

_____

20-25 _____

5-8

_____

25-30 _____
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10. Have you had any experience flying in mountainous areas?
No

______

Yes

______
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APPENDIX E
CONSENT FORM
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CONSENT FORM
You are invited to participate in a study entitled “Extending Long Term Working
Memory Theory to Dynamic Domains: The Nature of Retrieval Structures in Situation
Awareness” conducted by Mark Jodlowski of the Department of Psychology of
Mississippi State University. The study involves providing verbal reports while
examining approaches, various flight situations, and answering questions pertaining to
the flight simulation. During the experiment your verbal reports will be recorded. There
are no expected discomforts or risks involved in your participation. Equally, there are no
anticipated direct benefits to you other than monetary payment.
This experiment will require an approximate 2-hour time commitment. For your
participation, you will be paid $50 in cash at the end of the study. You are free to
withdraw your consent and discontinue participation in the study at any time, in which
case your data will not be used in the study. Only Mark Jodlowski and his collaborators
will have access to the information. In any publication of the study, all information will
be anonymous.

The investigator will be glad to answer any questions regarding the study procedures.
However, answers that may influence your performance will be deferred until the end of
the experiment. For further questions, you may contact Mark Jodlowski at (770) 8261738. For any additional information regarding human participation in research, please
contact the Mississippi State Regulatory Compliance Office at (662) 325-3294.

I understand the above information and voluntarily consent to participate in the
experiment entitled “Extending Long Term Working Memory Theory to Dynamic
Domains: The Nature of Retrieval Structures in Situation Awareness.” I have been given
a copy of this consent form to keep for my own records.

Signature ____________________________
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Date ______________
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